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INTRODUCTION
As little as 30 years ago, punitive damages awards were "rarely assessed"
and usually "small in amount." Recently, however, the frequeny and size
of such awards have been skyrocketing. One commentator has observed that
"hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar punitive damages
verdict in a product liability case." And it appears that the upward
trajectory continues unabated. The increased frequeny and size ofpunitive
awards, however, has not been matched by a corresponding expansion of
procedural protections or predictability. On the contrary, although some
courts have made genuine efforts at reform, many courts continue to provide
jurors with sheletal guidance that permits the traditional guarantor of
fairness-the jury itself-to be converted into a source of caprice and bias.1
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
1. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500-01 (1993) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Unfortunately, some manufacturers put corporate profit before
public safety. The threat of punitive damage sanctions, however,
serves to deter corporations from knowingly marketing unsafe
products and from trading public safety for corporate profits.
Punitive damage awards are a necessary restraint on the abuse of
corporate power, curbing the often anti-social practices of the
economic elite. As noted by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), the
imposition of punitive damage awards in product liability cases has
increased the safety in the everyday lives of American consumers
noticeably:
[W]e could spend an afternoon pointing out the good that product
liability has done. We do not get blown up by that Pinto gas tank.
Cars all have antilock brakes. That elevator is checked. The steps
are marked. Little children do not burn up in flammable pajamas.
The women of America are not threatened with Dalkon Shields.2
An increase in the magnitude and frequency of punitive damage
awards, however, necessitates a reconsideration of the doctrine and
precipitates the need for safeguards to protect the tort system from
abuse. Punitive damage reform must be enacted, and must address
the many criticisms of the current doctrine: that punitive damages
cause unnecessary litigation; are unjustified and excessive; far exceed
statutory penalties for similar conduct; subject defendants to multiple
punishments for the same conduct; overcompensate plaintiffs; are
detrimental to society because they handicap the competitiveness of
American businesses; are responsible for rising insurance costs; and
are unconstitutional on a variety of grounds.' Perhaps most trou-
bling, however, is the fact that although punitive damages are quasi-
criminal in nature,4 they are imposed in the course of civil litigation
without many of the procedural safeguards that accompany criminal
penalties.5
2. 142 CONG. REC. S2344 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
3. See, e.ag,John L. Meredith & Brian P. Casey, Taking Cover PreservingEror When Hit with
a Claim for Punitive Damages, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 923, 938 (1995) (noting that prejudicial awards
that evidence no concern for deterrence or retribution are unconstitutional regardless of size
of award (citing TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 467 (KennedyJ., concurring))); Developments in the
Law-Juty Determination of Punitive Damages, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514-15 (1997) (listing
potential harms resulting from excessive and indiscriminate punitive damage awards, including
"deterrence of socially desirable activities [and] removal of useful products from the market").
4. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (noting that punitive damages stand
somewhere between tort law, whose purpose is restitutionary, and criminal law, whose purpose
is retributive).
5. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (recognizing that although punitive awards
are quasi-criminal in nature, defendants cannot take advantage of safeguards associated with
criminal proceedings).
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The rise in punitive damage awards and the need to implement
safeguards have not gone unnoticed by state legislatures, thejudiciary,
and various other entities. Forty-six states have passed tort reform
legislation;6 there is a new Restatement of Torts;7 the Supreme Court
has rejected a punitive damage award as unconstitutionally excessive;8
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws recently approved a Model Punitive Damages Act.9
Despite these efforts, punitive awards of enormous magnitude still
are being exacted from unsuspecting corporate defendants for
differing standards of misconduct. The problem with state tort
reform is that actions that might warrant the imposition of punitive
damages in one state might not warrant them in another. The
current patchwork of state tort laws is ineffective against unjustified,
excessive awards and undermines the efficacy of the punitive damage
doctrine.
To date, the Supreme Court has considered whether punitive
damage awards violate the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments." Despite visiting the issue numerous times, the Court
has given little practical guidance regarding the propriety of punitive
damage awards. Notwithstanding the creation of substantive due
process, the Court is not the appropriate vehicle for weighing the
costs and benefits of the tort system or for instituting the type of
reform that is necessary to curb abuse of the punitive damage
doctrine." This is a legislative and not a judicial function.
12
6. See Kimberly A. Pace, The Tax Deductibility of Punitive Damage Payments: Who Should
Ultimately Bear the Burden for Corporate Misconduct?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 825, 843 (1996) (stating that
46 states have enacted tort reform legislation curbing punitive awards in response to increased
frequency and size of such awards in recent years).
7. SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Final Draft 1997).
8. SeeBMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
9. See MODEL PUNrrVE DAMAGES ACr (1996) [hereinafter MODEL ACr]. The Model Act
was passed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 18,
1996, to "tighten up" state procedures with respect to punitive damages. SeeMarcia Coyle, Model
Act Would Tighten Punitives, NAT'L I.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at A12. The commissioners hope that the
Model Act will be adopted by the states. Se id. It is doubtful, however, that the states will
abandon the effort expended in passing legislation that reflects their views on the appropriate
means of tort reform in favor of the Model Act.
10. See infra notes 70-207 and accompanying text (analyzing Supreme Court review of
damages under Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
11. SeeJim Fieweger, Note, The Need for Reform of Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 775, 794-800, 823 (1990) (illustrating
judicial system's inability to adapt to mass tort litigation).
12. See id. at 823 ("As a result of the state based nature of punitive claims, federal and state
courts are powerless to individually remedy the shortcomings in mass tort punitive damages
procedures. Congress, therefore, must step in to cure the ills of mass tort litigation.");Jonathan
Hadley Koenig, Note, Punitive Damage "Overkill" After TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources: The Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 751, 768-69 (1995)
(stressing need for legislative solution to punitive damage abuses).
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Should the Supreme Court supplant the jury's assessment of reason-
ableness and sense of community outrage with its own?
The punitive damages problem is a national problem that has an
enormous impact on interstate commerce, considering that seventy
percent of all products manufactured in the United States cross state
lines before they are sold.' Consequently, this national problem
requires a national solution.'4 No individual state legislature or
court has the ability to regulate beyond its geographic borders.'
The Supreme Court is not an efficient means for regulating excessive
punitive damages-nor is it the appropriate branch of government to
impose such standards. 6 As demonstrated in this Article, national
application of federal tort reform legislation is most capable of
regulating the imposition of punitive damage awards and eviscerating
the problems associated with these sanctions. The certainty and
predictability concomitant with federal legislation is necessary to
promote consistency, fairness, equality, predictability, and efficiency.
Part I of this Article describes the history, nature, and purpose of
punitive damages as well as the assessment process for these awards.
Part II details the current state of punitive damage awards and the
need for reform. Part III considers the measures states have taken to
regulate punitive damages within their borders. Part IV analyzes the
Supreme Court decisions that have set the constitutional parameters
of punitive damage awards. Part IV explores some of the undecided
contemporary issues that plague the tort system, noting that the
Supreme Court decisions in this area have not obviated the need for
federal reform.
Finally, in Part V, this Article addresses the merits of federal tort
reform legislation, concluding that federal tort reform, which would
regulate the punitive damage system on a national level, is necessary
to further the goals underlying punitive damage awards. Part V
examines the various tort reform issues that have been proposed,
13. See 142 CONG. REc. S2560 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
14. Although it is true that punitive damages traditionally have been a matter of state
regulation, Congress alone has the power to protect interstate commerce. SeeU.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, c. 3. States have been effective in regulating punitive damages within their borders, but
they are incapable of doing so on a national level. SeeJanet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus
Plaintiffs'Rights: The Constitutional Battle over Statutoiy Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LOY. U.
CHI. LJ. 405, 406-07 (1995) (explaining that courts have upheld state laws restricting punitive
damage awards).
15. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (indicating that Commerce Clause
prohibits states from regulating commerce wholly outside its borders even if such commerce
affects conditions within state).
16. See Fieweger, supra note 11, at 823 (stating that congressional solution to excessive
punitive awards is needed to address problem on national scale).
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including the issues of increasing the burden of proof and the liability
standard to obtain punitive awards, bifurcating the trial of punitive
damages from other issues in the case, capping punitive damage
awards, and implementing a regulatory compliance defense.
Part V proposes enacting federal legislation to increase the burden
of proof and liability standard in recognition of the quasi-criminal
nature of punitive damages. Such reform will safeguard against
undeserved punitive damage awards and infuse the system with the
certainty and predictability necessary to discourage misconduct and
reduce litigation. It also proposes bifurcation of trials to limit juror
bias, and the articulation of factors for mandatory consideration in
assessing the amount of punitive awards. It rejects capping punitive
damage awards because it undermines the goals of the punitive
damage doctrine and has a discriminatory impact on women and
minorities.
Part V also considers the regulatory compliance defense, recogniz-
ing that although such a defense should be a factor considered in the
assessment of punitive damage awards, using it as a conclusive defense
would be extremely dangerous. Part V concludes by finding that the
best solution is to have the regulatory and judicial systems working in
tandem to police corporate behavior.
I. PuNIrivE DAMAGES
A. The Nature and Purpose of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages long have been a part of American common
law,'7 as they were a part of the preceding English common law.'"
The debate regarding the legitimacy of the punitive damages doctrine
has been raging since the doctrine's inception.' Punitive damages,
17. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (recognizing propriety of awarding
punitive damages).
18. See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (KB. 1763) ("[Punitive d]amages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the
guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the
jury to the action itself."); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 274 (1989) (tracing roots of punitive damages to thirteenth century England). For
a detailed history of punitive damages, see Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Historical
Continuity ofPunitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1284-
1304 (1993).
19. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (1991) (comparing Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 342,382 (1872), with Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18,20 (Wis. 1914)). The Court
in Fay indicated, "The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an
unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of law." Fay, 53 N.H. at 382. In
comparison, the court in Luther saw punitive awards as a positive influence on society.
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unlike compensatory damages,2" are "awarded against a [manufactur-
er] to punish [it] for outrageous conduct and to deter [it] and others
like [it] from similar conduct in the future."2 Although the general
nature of tort law is a "private right," punitive damages are a "public
remedy" for a "public wrong."22 In this way, punitive damages are
state-imposed penalties for anti-social conduct, protecting society by
imposing penalties on manufacturers for their conscious, flagrant
indifference to human safety." Because compensatory damages
alone would be insufficient,24 punitive damages are needed to
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty
regulated by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of
government, discourages private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential, and
unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and
confidence in, the courts of law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not
cognizable, in or not sufficiently punished, by the criminal law.
Luther; 147 N.W. at 20.
20. Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate injured plaintiffs, to restore them
to the position they would have been in if the injury never had occurred. See RESATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Compensatory damages
reimburse the injured person for medical expenses, lost wages, lost earning capacity, and pain
and suffering. See id. Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the individual plaintiff.
See, e-g., Enstan Group, Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1583 n.14 (M.D. Ala. 1993);
Freeman v. World Airways, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 841, 846 (D. Ma. 1984); Morris v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
21. RESTATEMENT, supranote 20, § 908(1); see also Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
350 (1974) (noting that punitive damages "are not compensation for injury... [but] are private
fines levied by civiljuries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence");
WILLuAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 234 (1896) (stating that punitive damages
are awarded because of "the grossness of the wrong done, rather than as a measure of
compensation").
22. SeeAngela P. Harris, RereadingPunitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40
ALA. L. REv. 1079, 1097-98 (arguing that conventional notion of tort law as a private right
concerned only with compensation, and criminal law as a public right concerned with
punishment, is inaccurate).
23. See F. Warren Jacoby, The Relationship of Punitive Damages and Compensatory Damages in
Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REv. 585, 587 (1970) ("Punitive damages are not intended to
remunerate the injured party for the damages he may have sustained. They are not to
compensate; they are the penalty the law inflicts for gross, wanton, and culpable negligence, and
are allowed as a warning or as an example to defendants or others."); see also Allen v. R & H Oil
& Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1333 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Punitive damages ... are fundamentally
collective; their purpose is to protect society by punishing and deterring wrongdoing.").
24. See Douglas L. Carden, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L
REV. 895, 922 (1976) (stating that compensatory damages alone may not deter wrongful
conduct); see also The Product Liability Fairness Act: Hearings on S. 565 Before the Subcomm. an
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerc and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce Science, and
Transp., 104th Cong. 234-36 (1995) [hereinafter Product Liability Fairness Hearing] (statement of
Jonathan Massey, attorney, Washington, D.C.) (stating that compensatory damages alone are not
enough of a deterrent to keep dangerous products off the market-punitive damages are
necessary); Punitive Damage Tort Reform, 1995: Hearings on S. 671 & S. 672 Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. 79 (1995) [hereinafter Punitive Damages Hearing] (statement of
Robert Creamer, Executive Director, illinois Public Action). Mr. Creamer indicated that
compensatory damages alone do not provide enough protection to consumers:
In the Ford Pinto case, an economic calculation was made that 180 violent deaths and
180 additional serious injuries would cost the company less than the $11 per car
1580 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEw [Vol. 46:1573
punish guilty wrongdoers and to deter the future misconduct of
manufacturers.25 Punitive damages are intended as both a specific
deterrent, so that the offending defendant will not repeat her
misconduct, as well as a general deterrent, so that others will be
dissuaded from engaging in similar misconduct.
Punitive damage awards are quasi-criminal sanctions imposed on
the wrongdoer to punish misconduct and to deter similar offensive
conduct by the defendant and other potential wrongdoers. 26 "The
concept of punitive damages lies in the borderland that both bridges
and separates criminal law and torts."27 These awards are not really
damages at all; they serve the same purpose as fines and penalties.28
"The very labels given 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages, as well as
the rationales that support them, demonstrate that they share key
characteristics of criminal sanctions."29 Punitive damages are civil
payments imposed to punish or deter ° socially reprehensible
necessary to prevent them. It is only the possibility that ajury might award substantial
punitive damages of unknown size that prevents this kind of death calculus from being
done by corporations every day.
Id.
25. See Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1377, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1991)
(upholding size of punitive damage award because of its deterrent effect on manufacturer);
Lynda G. Wilson, Note, Corporate Successor Liability for Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 40 S.C. L. REv. 509, 513-14 (1989) (stating that punitive damages help in deterring
misconduct and prove to be useful tool in preventing manufacturers' wrongful acts).
26. SeePacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting)
(describing punitive damages as "quasi-criminal punishment"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) ("[P]unitive damages advance the interests of
punishment and deterrence, which are also among the interests advanced by the criminal law
... "); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that
punitive damage awards are "quasi-criminal"); see alsoDavid G. Owen, PunitiveDamages in Products
Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 1258, 1260 (1976) (detailing purpose of punitive damages
in products liability litigation); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:
Addressing the Problem of Fairness, Efficiency and Contro4 52 FORDHAM L REV. 37, 43 (1983)
(addressing quasi-criminal nature of punitive sanctions).
27. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Effciency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1982).
28. SeeRSTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 908 cmt. a (stating that purpose of punitive damages
is same as purpose of criminal fines); see also David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages Against Manufacturers ofDefectiveProducts, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1982) ("[T]he purpose
of such damages is punishment and deterrence, rather than compensation ... ."); Seltzer, supra
note 26, at 43 (explaining that purpose of punitive damages is to punish offenders).
29. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 281 (1994); see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19
(noting that punitive damages serve same purposes as criminal punishment----"retribution and
deterrence"); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (stating that punitive
damages "serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect private fines").
30. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (finding that most states impose punitive damages "for
purposes of retribution and deterrence"); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851)
(explaining that juries often awarded additional compensation to plaintiffs in cases where
defendants' acts were seen as wanton or malicious); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326,
1332-33 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that punitive damages punish wrongdoers for their intentional
or malicious acts and are used to deter similar future conduct); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717
F.2d 828, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1983) (providing arguments for and against using punitive damages
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conduct that places public safety in jeopardy.1
B. Arriving at a Proper Punitive Damage Award
Two issues have been the subject of much debate in assessing a
punitive damage award: (1) the factors that the decision-maker
should take into account when determining the amount of punitive
damages to award; and (2) whether the judge or jury should
determine the amount of the award and at what point in the
proceeding it should be determined.
1. Factors to be considered in determining the amount of punitive
damages to award
Many factors can be taken into account when assessing a punitive
damage award. Some states have legislated the factors that should be
considered by the fact-finder when determining the amount of
punitive damages. In Kansas, for example, where the judge, not the
jury, determines the amount of punitive damages to award, the court
may consider:
(1) The likelihood at the time of the alleged misconduct that
serious harm would arise from the defendant's misconduct;
(2) the degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood;
(3) the profitability of the defendant's misconduct;
to serve goals of punishment and deterrence); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727,
735-36 (Minn. 1980) ("The punitive damages remedy serves to punish a... manufacturer for
and deter that manufacturer from willfully, wantonly, or maliciously marketing a [product]
which is unreasonably dangerous.... ."); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 458-59
(Wis. 1980) (indicating thatjury awards should not be more than necessary to serve purposes
of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence); see also Model Act, supra note 9, § 1 at 3
(noting that "'punitive damages' means an award of money made to a claimant solely to punish
or deter"); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of PunitiveDamages in Products
Liability Litigation, 74 KY. LJ. 1, 39, 70-71 (1986) (explaining economic model of punitive
damages for purpose of deterrence); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive DamagesforDeterrence: When and
How Much , 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (1989) (indicating that punishment and deterrence are
goals of punitive damages); Ellis, supra note 27, at 8-9 (describing objective of punitive damage
awards); Jacoby, supra note 23, at 587-88; Owen, supra note 28, at 8-9.
31. But see Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 So. CALL. REV. 79,
90 (1982) (suggesting that courts may have additional motives for awarding punitive damages
including rewarding plaintiff; who otherwise would not have sued and compensating victims
fully); Ellis, supra note 27, at3 (listing several purposes for imposing punitive damages including
preserving the peace, inducing private law enforcement, compensating victims for otherwise
uncompensated losses, and paying plaintiffs' attorney fees); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damage
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 ViL. L. REV. 363, 374 (1994) (articulating five
functions of punitive damage awards: education, retribution, deterrence, compensation, and
law enforcement); see also Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F.
Supp. 64, 105 (D.S.C. 1979) (holding that punitive damages deter manufacturers from
misconduct, encourage production of safer products, and serve as "private revenge which is
carried out in the courts rather than through duels or in back alleys"), aft, 644 F.2d 877 (4th
Cir. 1981). This Article addresses only true punitive damage awards, not compensatory damages
masked as punitive.
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(4) the duration of the misconduct and any intentional conceal-
ment of it;
(5) the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of
the misconduct;
(6) the financial condition of the defendant; and,
(7) the total deterrent effect of other damages and punishment
imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct,
including but not limited to, compensatory, exemplary and punitive
damage awards to persons in situations similar to those of the
claimant and the severity of the criminal penalties to which the
defendant has been or may be subjected."2
In other states, the courts have fashioned the factors for consider-
3ation.
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b) (1994); see also MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(e) (Supp.
1996). The Mississippi Code also mandates that courts consider a variety of factors in assessing
damages:
In all cases involving an award of punitive damages, the fact-finder, in determining the
amount of punitive damages, shall consider, to the extent relevant, the following: the
defendant's financial condition and net worth; the nature and reprehensibility of the
defendant's wrongdoing, for example, the impact of defendant's conduct on the
plaintiff, or the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff- the defendant's
awareness of the amount of harm being caused and the defendant's motivation in
causing such harm; the duration of the defendant's misconduct and whether the
defendant attempted to conceal such misconduct; and any other circumstances shown
by the evidence that bear on determining a proper amount of punitive damages.
33. See Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Prods., 929 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1996). The court in Coffey
enumerated the factors for consideration in assessing a punitive damage award:
[1]n Hodges we set forth a list of factors to guide the discretion of the fact finder in
assessing the amount of punitive damages. We instructed the fact finder to consider:
(1) The defendant's financial affairs, financial condition, and net worth;
(2) The nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's wrongdoing, for example
(A) The impact of defendant's conduct on the plaintiff, or
(B) The relationship of defendant to plaintiff-
(3) The defendant's awareness of the amount of harm being caused and
defendant's motivation in causing the harm;
(4) The duration of defendant's misconduct and whether defendant attempted
to conceal the conduct;
(5) The expense plaintiff has borne in the attempt to recover the losses;
(6) Whether defendant profited from the activity, and if defendant did profit,
whether the punitive award should be in excess of the profit in order to deter
similar future behavior,
(7) Whether, and the extent to which, defendant has been subjected to previous
punitive damage awards based upon the same wrongful act;
(8) Whether, once the misconduct became known to the defendant, defendant
took remedial action or attempted to make amends by offering a prompt and fair
settlement for actual harm caused;
(9) Any other circumstances shown by the evidence that bear on determining the
proper amount of the punitive award.
Id at 328 (citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901-02 (Tenn. 1992)); see also
Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 941 n.19 (D.C. 1995) (explaining factors
drawn from common law used in determining punitive awards); Schaffer v. Edward D.Jones &
Co., 552 N.W.2d 801, 807 n.3 (S.D. 1996) (setting forth factorsjury may consider when awarding
punitive damages); Management Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 539
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The many factors that legislators and judges have created can be
reduced to three basic considerations: (1) the character of the
defendant's act; (2) the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries;
and (3) the defendant's wealth.' A jury considers the character of
the defendant's act so that the punishment will bear some relation-
ship to the wrong committed. 5 The jury is told to take into account
the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries so that the punitive
damages awarded will have a rational relationship to the injury
caused." The jury also is instructed to consider the financial
position of the defendant so that the punitive damage award actually
will punish and deter the defendant.37 This third factor has been
the subject of considerable criticism.s The rationale behind
consideration of the defendant's financial position is that the
N.W.2d 111, 122 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that Wisconsin "case law establishes the factors
to be considered in determining the proper amount to be awarded as punitive damages").
34. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 908(2) & cmts. b-e.
35. See Owen, supra note 28, at 9 (noting thatjuries consider the seriousness of defendant's
misconduct when assessing punitive damages).
36. SeeTXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,460 (1993) (noting that
in calculating punitive damages,jury may consider potential harm that might have resulted from
defendant's bad acts as well as harm that actually occurred, but requiring reasonable
relationship between harm and punitive damage award (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991))); Games v. Fleming L.andfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 909 (W. Va.
1991) ("As a matter of fundamental fairness, punitive damages should bear a reasonable
relationship to compensatory damages."); see also Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828, 839
(3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that size of compensatory damage award should be considered when
assessing punitive award); Tudor Assocs. Ltd., II v. AJ & AJ Servicing, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 68, 79
(E.D.N.C. 1993) (requiring punitive damage awards to "bear a rational relationship to the sum
reasonably needed to punish the defendant for his conduct"); Owen, supra note 28, at 9
(explaining that some states mandate that punitive awards "bear a reasonable relationship" to
compensatory award). But seeJacoby, supra note 23, at 603-04 (arguing that there is no logical
basis for requiring punitive damages to be related to compensatory). The Supreme Court made
clear in TXO, however, that the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages, although a factor
to be considered, is not dispositive. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 462.
37. See, eg., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991) (stating that in
assessing punitive damages, jury should consider "financial position" of defendant); Boyle v.
Lorimar Productions, Inc., 13 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that California's jury
instructions require juries to consider defendant's financial condition in determining whether
award is sufficient to punish and deter); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 603
(W.D. Okla. 1979) (instructing jury that consideration of defendant's wealth when assessing
punitive damages is "consistent with the general purpose of such an award in deterring the
defendant... from committing similar acts in the future, and for punishment of the defendant
for such acts"), afld, 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980).
38. SeeKenneth S. Abraham &John C.Jeffhies,Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The
Role of Defendant's Wealth, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 415, 416-20 (1989) (arguing that considering
defendant's wealth when assessing a punitive award encourages punishment based solely on
defendant's status, is incompatible with purposes of tort law and compensation, and does not
deter socially undesirable conduct). Such criticism ignores the fact that punitive damages are
not based merely in tort law, but actually stand between tort and criminal law, therefore, the fact
that considerations of wealth make them incompatible with the traditional notions of tort
compensation offers no support for excluding this information from the punitive damage
assessment process.
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deterrent benefit of punitive awards will be unrealized if the award
does not cause the defendant to suffer.3 9 Wealthy defendants,
therefore, might have to pay more than poor defendants for
committing the exact same offense." In theory, the defendant's
wealth should be irrelevant because society is equally harmed when
a poor defendant acts with flagrant indifference as it is when a rich
one behaves indifferently. Despite the characterization of the wrong
as a public wrong, the goals of punitive awards-punishment and
deterrence-will not be effectuated equally when the penalty impacts
defendants differently because of their financial status. The fact-
finder must consider the defendant's wealth so that the damage award
will have an equally punitive effect on all wrongdoers, because it takes
more to punish a wealthy defendant than it does to punish a poor
one. A multi-billion dollar corporation, like Exxon, for example,
would not be punished or deterred by a $100,000 punitive damage
award, but the same award could cripple a small business owner, like
Joe's Gas Station.41 To punish and deter manufacturers effectively
and equitably, therefore, the financial status of the defendant should
be a factor in determining the amount of punitive damages to
award.4" The defendant's wealth alone, however, should not justify
39. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 464 n.29 (noting that for punitive damages to be effective, courts
must take into account all relevant factors, including defendant's financial position); cf.
Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 628-29
(1997) (arguing that amount of punitive damages should reflect defendant's financial position).
40. The jury instruction given in TXO read in relevant part:
The object of [punitive damages] is to deter [product manufacturers] from committing
like offenses in the future. Therefore the law recognizes that to in fact deter such
conduct may require a larger fine upon one of large means than it would upon one
of ordinary means under the same or similar circumstances.
TXO, 509 U.S. at 464 n.29.
41. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 880, 889 (W. Va. 1992)
("[A]n award that might be unreasonable if awarded againstJeff's Neighborhood Hot Dog Stand
could be quite reasonable if awarded for the same conduct against McDonald's."), affld, 509 U.S.
443 (1993).
42. See Hasip, 499 U.S. at 21-22 (noting that in assessing punitive damages, jury should
consider "financial position" of defendant); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1333
(5th Cir. 1995) (indicating that because the purpose of punitive damages is to deter wrong-
doing, damage awards are tailored to defendant's wealth); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d
828, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[T]his court has previously recognized that ... the wealth of the
defendant... should be taken into account in assessing punitive damages."); Caron v. Caron,
577 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Me. 1990) (noting that damages must have some relationship to
defendant's financial status in order to act as deterrent); Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440
A.2d 359,363 (Me. 1982) (stating that punitive damage awards "must... bear some relationship
to the actual wealth of the defendant"); Whittington v. Whittington, 535 So. 2d 573,584 (Miss.
1988) (considering financial worth of defendant in computing punitive damages); Bundy v.
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984) (finding that, in absence of evidence
regarding defendant's net worth, an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained); see also
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994) (stating that court must consider financial condition of
defendant in assessing punitive damage award); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(e) (Supp. 1996)
(noting that fact-finder must consider "defendant's financial condition and net worth" in
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imposition of a disproportionately large punitive damage award. 43
2. Who decides how much to award and when
Most states allow juries to determine the amount of punitive
damage awards." Judges, however, retain the power to remit or
reverse the award if they believe that it reflects a prejudice or passion
on the part of the jury.'
With regard to when punitive damages are determined, many states
permit some form of bifurcation of the punitive damage issues.
Illinois permits all issues related to punitive damages to be tried
separately but by the same fact-finder at the defendant's request.46
Other states, like Kansas and Montana, allow the jury in the first
proceeding to determine whether to award punitive damages and
then require a separate, second proceeding to determine the amount
of such an award.47 Some states have determined that evidence of
the defendant's wealth should not be admitted until the separate
proceeding on the amount of punitive damages, because such
evidence tends to prejudice the jury.' Jurors tend to be biased
determining amount of punitive damages to award); RESTATEmENT, supra note 20, § 908(2) &
cmts. b-e.
43. See Haslp, 499 U.S. at 22.
While punitive damages in Alabama may embrace such factors as the heinousness of
the civil wrong, its effect upon the victim, the likelihood of its recurrence, and the
extent of the defendant's wrongful gain, the factfinder must be guided by more than
the defendant's net worth. Alabama plaintiffs do not enjoy a windfall because they
have the good fortune to have a defendant with a deep pocket.
Id.
44. See Owen, supra note 28, at 9. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991)
(noting that judge shall determine amount of punitive damages to be awarded in products
liability cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994) (allowingjury to decide if punitive damages
are appropriate, but shifting determination of amount from jury to judge); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.80 (Anderson 1995) (mandating that court determine amount of damages); Owen,
supra note 26, at 1320-22 (advocating that judges, not juries, should determine amount of
punitive damage awards); Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment, Judge or Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive
Damages, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1089 (1996) (arguing that judges, notjuries, should decide amount
of punitive damage awards).
45. See, ag., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (up-
holding trial court's remittitur to $3.5 million of a jury award of $125 million in punitive
damages); 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 1992) (noting that trial court has
discretion to enter remittitur if punitive damage award is excessive). In fact, in Honda Motor Co.
v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), the Supreme Court held that an amendment to a state
constitution that prohibited judicial review of punitive damage awards was a violation of due
process. See id. at 432.
46. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05(c) (West Supp. 1996); see also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1996) (permitting separate proceeding to determine punitive
damages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1ID-30 (1995) (allowing defendant to request that liability for
compensatory and punitive damages be tried separately).
47. See, eg., RAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (a) (1991).
48. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (a) (1995) (stating that evidence of defendant's
financial condition is not admissible until fact finder determines, in a separate proceeding,
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against large, wealthy corporations, particularly when the corporation
does not have strong ties to the state.49
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Courts and commentators have found that punitive damage awards
are increasing at an alarming pace."0 Dissenting in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,5' Justice O'Connor noted:
Recent years... have witnessed an explosion in the frequency and
size of punitive damages awards. A recent study by the RAND
Corporation found that punitive damages were assessed against one
of every ten defendants who were found liable for compensatory
damages in California. The amounts can be staggering. Within
nine months of our decision in Browning-Ferris, there were no fewer
than six punitive damages awards of more than $20 million.
Medians as well as averages are skyrocketing, meaning that even
routine awards are growing in size. The amounts "seem to be
limited only by the ability of lawyers to string zeros together in
drafting a complaint."
5 2
amount of punitive damage award, at which point defendant's financial condition must be
considered); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (1996) (noting that evidence of defendant's
wealth is admissible only after finding liability for punitive damages); Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432
("[T]he presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential thatjuries will
use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local
presences.").
49. See Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432 (recognizingjury bias against large out-of-state firms); see also
Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F.3d 132, 138 (6th Cir. 1996) (deciding that review
of arbitrators' punitive awards is unwarranted "because arbitrators do not share juries' bias
against big business defendants").
50. See, &g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Over the last 20 years, the Court has repeatedly criticized common-law punitive
damages procedures on the ground that they invite discriminatory and otherwise illegitimate
awards." (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974))); id. at 39 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[P]unitive damages assessed under common-law procedures are far from a fossil,
or even an endangered species. They are (regrettably to many) vigorously alive. To effect their
elimination may well be wise, but is not the role of the Due Process Clause."); Browning-Ferris
Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'ConnorJ., and Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.
As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate
court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high
have been sustained on appeal.") (internal citations omitted); see also Product Liability Fairness
Hearing, supra note 24, at 432 (statement of Theodore B. Olson, Esq., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP) (stating that "punitive damage awards are exploding out of control"). But see Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical
Data, 78 IOwA L. Ray. 1, 57-58 (1992) (finding that from 1965 to 1990, there were only 355
punitive damage awards in products liability cases and more than half of these punitive damage
awards were reduced in settlement or were reduced by appellate courts).
51. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
52. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1991) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting)
(internal citations omitted).
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Nowhere is the proof of out-of-control awards more evident than in
the staggering jury verdicts themselves and in the trial or appellate
court treatment of such verdicts on review:
In August, September, and October 1994, for example, juries
imposed punitive exactions of $5 billion against Exxon; $109
million against Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.; $80 million
against Hughes Aircraft; $70 million against a director of Amerco,
the corporate parent of U-Haul; $65 million against Southern
California Physicians Insurance Exchange; $58 million against
Maryland Casualty Co.; $57.5 million against Key Pharmaceutical;
$50 million against Mercury Finance; $31 million against Chevron
U.S.A.; $15 million against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; $8
million against Schering-Plough Corp.; $7 million against Nash
Finch Co.; $6.9 million against the law firm Baker & McKenzie; $6.6
million against Farmers Insurance Co.; $6.5 million against Wal-
Mart; $5 million against the Hilton Hotel Corporation; and $2.7
million against McDonald's.
5 3
Most of these jury awards subsequently were reduced by trial or
appellatejudges and other cases were settled for less than the amount
awarded.54 In fact, thirty of the seventy-two jury verdicts in 1994 for
53. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589
(1996) (No. 94-896).
54. For example, in the well-publicized McDonald's case in which a customer spilled coffee
into her lap, thejury's award of $2.7 million in punitive damages was reduced by the judge to
$640,000. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 W. 360309, at
*1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994); Benjamin Weiser, Tort Reform's Promise Peri" Legislation Could Mean
Tight Limits on Liability, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1995, at Al (stating that $2.7 million award later
was reduced byjudge to $640,000). The $70 million verdict against a director ofAmerco ivas
reduced to $7 million. SeeIn reShoen, 193 B.R. 302,305 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996) (reducingjury
damages award in remittitur proceeding based on jury finding that defendants reduced
plaintiff's stock value in contested corporation by $1.4 billion). The $58 million verdict against
Maryland Casualty for breach of contract and bad faith also was reversed as excessive. See
Dempsey v. Maryland Cas. Co., BC-033631 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles Co., Oct. 27, 1994)
(invalidating $61 million jury award based on Maryland Casualty's breach of contract and bad
faith in refusing to pay fire insurance claim); Verdicts Reversed byjudges, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 6, 1995,
at C14 (listing Dempsey as one of 11 of 1994's largest damage award reversals). In the Mercury
Finance case, the judge found the $50 million award excessive and offered the plaintiff a choice
between a new trial or a remitted award of $2 million. SeeJohnson v. Mercury Fin. Co. of Ala.,
No. CV-93-072 (Cir. Ct. Barbour Co. Ala.,Jan. 27, 1995) (reducing award through undisclosed
settlement when trial court deemed $90,000 compensatory and $50 million punitive awards
excessive based on used car sale in which $1000 was added to $2700 automobile purchase price
to cover financing acquisition fee); Alvin C. Harrell, Disclosure of "Acquisition Fees" in Assignments
of Consumer Chattel 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 145, 147-48 (1995) (describing political climate
in Barbour County, Alabama, including historical ties between plaintiffs attorney, 6000 member
jury pool, andjudge presiding over case which led to excessive award in "aberrational" decision
of otherwise "well-settled" legal principle in consumer chattel paper transfer). The parties
reportedly settled rather than seek a new trial. See id. at 148. The $6.9 million punitive damage
award against Baker & McKenzie for sexual harassment subsequently was reduced by the judge
to $3.5 million. See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 581, 584-85
(Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994) (finding 138:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory award excessive
where law firm defendant took corrective action before trial by forcing offending partner to
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$10 million or more were reduced or set aside.5 Two truths can be
deduced from this fact: (1) juries are awarding unjustified and
excessive punitive damages with increasing frequency; and (2) the
check of judicial review is functioning in some cases as an effective
safeguard against the unbridled discretion ofjuries.
5 6
Judicial remittitur is not enough, however. Even with that
mechanism, the amounts affirmed by appellate courts are rising
exponentially along with jury verdicts. 7 Moreover, appellate courts
are not guided by any "perceptible formula" in remitting awards."
There is no uniform method to the courts' punitive damage award
reductions; often there is no explanation as to why the verdict is
excessive or why the remitted amount was chosen as the appropriate
punishment. Judicial review of punitive awards, like the jury verdicts
themselves, is guided only by the general rule that the award not be
excessive. Finally, because the fear of excessive jury verdicts drive
settlements, 9 the fact that judicial remittitur permits after-the-fact
correction of unconstitutional awards does not provide a valid
leave firm and reducing award from $6.9 million to $3.5 million). The judge reversed the $80
million verdict against Hughes for racial discrimination, finding the award excessive and "grossly
disproportionate." Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. Inc., BC-075519 (Super. CL, Los Angeles Co.,
Oct. 19, 1994) (finding that prejudicial evidence was admitted improperly and that plaintiflfs
counsel improperly used inflammatory language in arguments tojury); Verdicts Reversed by Judges,
NAT'L LJ., Feb. 6, 1995, at C14 (citing Hughes Aircraft as one of 11 of 1994's largest damage
award reversals). The $109 million judgment against Blockbuster for "maliciously defrauding
one of its investors" was settled. See Owen McDonald, Out-of-Court Settlement Reached in Blockbuster
Investor Suit, Jan. 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8351823. The $5 million judgment against Hilton
Hotel for negligence and for maliciously and oppressively denying the plaintiff her right to safety
subsequently was reduced by the judge to $3.9 million. See Coughlin v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 879
F. Supp. 1047, 1053 (D. Nev. 1995) (reducing compensation contribution and punitive treble
damage amounts by $400,000 previouslypaid by separate defendant); Robin Abcarian, Balancing
Safety and the Bottom Line in Nevada, LA TIMES, June 7, 1995, at 1 (reporting Nevada state
legislative efforts to reduce hotel liability for safety and security related negligence involving
hotel guests).
55. See Weiser, supra note 54, at Al (outlining proposed tort reform legislation). In his
exhaustive 1992 study of punitive damages, Professor Michael Rustad found that half of all
punitive awards are appealed and half of those appealed are reversed or reduced. See Rustad,
supra note 50, at 57-58. Yet even this study does not reflect accurately how many awards would
have been reduced by the court because many plaintiffs settle for less than tie amount rewarded
before the court has the opportunity to reduce. See id.
56. See Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in theJurisprudence ofJuries: Comparing the
Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrin 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1301 (1996) (arguing that
courts have regulated the imposition of punitive damages by focusing 'jury deliberation on
factors deemed relevant by the legislature and minimiz[ing] consideration of irrelevant factors").
57. See Product Liability Fairness Hearing, supra note 24, at 432 (statement of Theodore B.
Olson, Esq., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP) ("[T]he frequency and magnitude of punitive
damage awards are exploding out of control when measured either by jury verdicts or by
amounts affirmed on appeal ...
58. See id.
59. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway.: A Philisophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. LJ. 2663, 2680-81 (1995) (describing effect ofjury
verdicts and settlement process on future litigation).
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solution. Safeguards should be implemented to prevent the abuse
earlier in the trial process, thereby saving the parties and the courts
time and money. Moreover, if the rise in the magnitude and
frequency of punitive damage awards is unjustified, then inappropri-
ate punitive damage judgments are being awarded, unfairly subjecting
defendants to the social stigma of being branded a wrongdoer and
forcing defendants to spend time and money defending against
undeserved penalties.'
III. STATE TORT REFORM LEGISLATION
As a result of the increase in frequency and magnitude of punitive
damage awards in the last ten years, state legislatures have been
actively passing tort reform legislation. Forty-six states either have
prohibited punitive damages or have enacted legislation aimed at
reducing their frequency and size.6 '
Due to the perceived increase in awards of punitive damages in
products liability litigation,' states have started to regulate punitive
damages more heavily to ensure that they are administered fairly.
Most state statutes prescribe the purposes behind punitive damages, 3
the conditions on which punitive damages may be awarded,' the
burden of proving liability for such an award,65 and the factors that
60. See Punitive Damages Hearing, supra note 24, at 85-94 (statement of George L. Priest,
Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School). According to one study, there has been a
dramatic increase in punitive damage claims filed in tort cases. See id. at 87.
61. See Pace, supra note 6, at 841.
62. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of
Punitive Damages in Modem Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989) ("The last
two decades have witnessed dramatic growth in both the frequency and size of punitive damages
awards in product liability litigation .... Today, hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-
dollar punitive damages verdict in a product liability case."); see alsoJames B. Sales, The Emergence
of Punitive Damages in Product Liaility Actions: A Further Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J.
351,391-92 (1983) (noting that product suppliers are threatened by number and size of punitive
damages awards facing manufacturing industry). But seeStephen Daniels &Joanne Martin, Myth
and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35-62 (1990) (presenting empirical evidence
to contradict claims regarding size and frequency of punitive damages awards); Rustad, supra
note 50, at 23 ("Every empirical study of punitive damages awards concludes that there is simply
no evidence that punitive damages are routinely awarded.").
63. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. § 51-12-5.1(c) (1993 & Supp. 1996) ("[P]unitive damages shall
be awarded not as compensation to a plaintiff but solely to punish, penalize, or deter a
defendant ...."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(1) (f) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) ("' [P]unitive
damages' includes exemplary damages and means damages, other than compensatory and
nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish and to discourage him and others from
similar conduct in the future ....").
64. See, eg, ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (Supp. 1992); CAL. CiV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp.
1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d), (e)
(1993 & Supp. 1996); 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/22107 (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2307.801(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1995).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie Supp. 1996); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3294(a); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b); IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(1) (1992); 735 ILL.
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the jury may consider in assessing the award.6" Some states have
raised the burden of proof necessary to obtain a punitive damage
award from "a preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and
convincing evidence."67 Other states have placed a ceiling on the
amount of the punitive damage award,' and some have barred
punitive damages if the wrongdoer had complied with existing
government regulations. 9
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21115.05(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 344-34-2 (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(a) (West 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A.15-5.12 (West Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-
11 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (products liability cases); id. § 2315.21(c) (3)
(all other tort actions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9(A) (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537;
S.C. CODEANN. § 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-3701(c) (Michie 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(a) (1992). The state of Colorado raised the burden of proof to
"beyond a reasonable doubt" before punitive damages can be imposed. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1989). The state of Maryland requires proof of actual malice. See
MD. CODEANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-504(b) (1995); see also Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601
A.2d 633, 653 (Md. 1992) (holding that proof of actual malice is required to award punitive
damages).
66. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.801(B); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(2); TEx. CIV.
PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.011(a), 41.012 (West 1997).
67. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-21-102 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that punitive
damage awards cannot exceed compensatory damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (limiting punitive damages to three times
compensatory damages unless plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that higher
award is not excessive); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.05(a) (limiting punitive damages to three
times economic damages); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-4; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-221; NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (imposing $300,000 cap on punitive damages
when actual damages are less than $100,000); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A15-5.14(b) (limiting punitive
damages to five times compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1D-25(b) (capping punitive damages at greater of three times compensatory damages or
$250,000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (stating that punitive damages cannot exceed two
times compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9; TEx. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (capping
punitive damages at greater of $200,000 or four times compensatory damages); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (capping all punitive damages at $350,000). But see GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1(e) (1) ("In a tort case in which the cause of action arises from product liability, there
shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be awarded as punitive damages.")
(emphasis added). Georgia does, however, offer defendants some protection in that only one
punitive award can be recovered for any act regardless of the number of separate causes of
action that might arise from that act. See id. § 51-12-5.1 (e) (1). Although this may aid
corporations being sued in Georgia, it has no bearing on actions brought in other states,
because Georgia's power to legislate stops at its borders. See supra notes 14-15 and accompany-
ing text (discussing national scope of tort award problems).
69. See, eg., 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/2-2107 (stating that if defendant's conduct "was
approved by or was in compliance with standards set forth in an applicable federal or state
statute or in a regulation" then no punitive damages may be awarded); OHIO RE%'. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80 (compliance with FDA regulations bars punitive damage awards); 1987 TEX. GEN.
LAWS § 81.008 (same). But see Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 735-36 (Minn.
1980) (holding that compliance with minimal federal standards of product flammability testing
in children's clothing materials does not preclude award of punitive damages).
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By limiting and regulating the award of punitive damages, states are
sanctioning their imposition. Such regulation makes punitive dam-
ages look more like fines and penalties imposed by the state to punish
intolerable conduct than like damage awards. As the states have
recognized, procedural safeguards are needed to protect defendants
from the wrongful imposition of these quasi-criminal sanctions and to
protect the integrity of the legal system.
IV. JUDICIAL REFORM OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As the frequency and magnitude of punitive damages have grown,
so have the challenges to their constitutionality.7 ° The Supreme
Court has considered whether punitive damage awards violate the
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.7 Until re-
cently, the Court merely has criticized runaway jury verdicts in
punitive damage cases and stressed the need for legislative reform to
curtail these abuses.7 2 In its recent decision, BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore,73 the Court expressed its willingness to use judicial
discretion to strike down awards that are deemed excessive.74 Many
questions surround the Supreme Court's scrutiny of the constitution-
70. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996) (due process
challenge); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (procedural due process
challenge); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,446 (1993) (procedural
and substantive due process challenge); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7 (1990)
(procedural due process challenge); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 276-77 (1989) (due process and excessive fines challenge); Paul M. Sykes, Note,
Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1084, 1086 n.9 (1997) (listing recent Supreme Court decisions involving
constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards).
71. See U.S. CONsr. amend. V ("[N] or shall any person be subject fcr the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."); U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common
law... no fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."); U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed.. . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ").
72. See, eg., Hasip, 499 U.S. at 41 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (urging legislators to consider
measures that address size and unpredictability of punitive damages awards).
73. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
74. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1602-03 (1996) ("As in Haslip,[499
U.S. 1 (1991),] we are not prepared to draw a bright line marking the constitutionally
acceptable punitive damages award. Unlike that case, however, we are fully convinced that the
grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the constitutional limit."). At least a
majority of the Court held that the award was unconstitutionally excessive. Unfortunately, the
Justices are no more uniform in their views regarding the regulation of punitive damage awards
than the 50 states. See Timothy S. Lykowski, Tightening the Constitutional Noose Around Punitive
Damages Challenges: TXO, Mhat It Means, and Suggestions That Address Remaining Concerns, 68 S.
CAL. L. REv. 203, 228-38 (1994) (providing comparative analysis of various Supreme Court
Justices' approaches to punitive damages awards includingJustice Scalia's "traditional approach,"
Justice Stevens' "reasonableness" approach, Justice Kennedy's "comparative" approach, and
Justice O'Connor's "most limiting" approach).
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ality of punitive damages and, in particular, whether there is any
legitimate constitutional basis for overturning such jury awards. The
following analysis of Supreme Court cases that have considered the
constitutionality of punitive damage awards reveals that the Supreme
Court has not yet spoken on many contemporary issues. A survey of
these cases further raises the questions of whether the Supreme
Court's reform of punitive damages has helped to clarify the law at
all, and whether these decisions have highlighted the need for federal
legislation to regulate such damages.
A. The Fifth Amendment-Double Jeopardy Clause
[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... 1*
In United States v. Halper,76 the Supreme Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment limits the amount
the government can recover (for punishment) in a civil action after
the defendant already has been criminally punished." In Halper, the
defendant was convicted of violating sixty-five counts of the criminal
false claims statute, was sentenced to two years imprisonment, and
then was assessed a $5000 fine when the government brought a
subsequent civil suit.' The Supreme Court held that the civil
penalty was unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clause
because it amounted to two separate punishments for the same
offense.
79
The Court further stated, however, that "nothing in today's opinion
precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for
conduct that previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and
punishment. The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not
triggered by litigation between private parties.""° Despite this state-
ment, when a portion of the punitive damage award is paid to the
state, the Double Jeopardy Clause, like the Excessive Fines Clause,
could be implicated." Although being punished twice in the civil
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
76. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
77. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989).
78. See id. at 437-38.
79. See id at 448-49. The Court held that if the civil payment had been remedial, as
opposed to punitive, it would have been constitutional. See id.
80. AL at 451.
81. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (considering Double Jeopardy Clause
implications of splitting plaintiffs' damage awards in light of growing state efforts to recoup
portions of punitive damage awards into state treasuries and victims' compensation funds); see
also Clay R. Stevens, Comment, Split-Recovey: A Constitutional Answer to the Punitive Danages
1592
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justice system may not be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amend-
ment, the constitutional prohibition against doublejeopardy generally
supports the argument that repetitive punishment is fundamentally
unfair.
8 2
B. The Eighth Amendment-Are Punitive Damage Awards
Excessive Fines?
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
83
Punitive damages awards also have been attacked on Eighth
Amendment grounds because they can allegedly constitute excessive
fines. The Supreme Court, in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 4 rejected a claim that a $6 million punitive damage
award was unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 5 The Court held that the Excessive Fines
Clause does not apply to awards in litigation between private
parties.8 6 The Court explained that the excessive fines clause "does
not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the
government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages awarded.
"8 7
This language implies that a punitive damage award, if apportioned
between the plaintiff and the state, could raise constitutional concerns
under the Eighth Amendment.' In Browning-Feris, the Court
Dilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 857,885 (1994) (arguing that Court in Halperimplicitly suggested that
split recovery of punitive damages implicates Double Jeopardy Clause).
82. See Stevens, supra note 81, at 884.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
84. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
85, See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
Until 1980, Browning-Ferris was the sole provider of roll-off waste collection service (large scale
trash removal) in Burlington, Vermont. See id. That year, a former Browning-Ferris local
manager entered the market himself, creating a company named Kelco. See id. Kelco had 40%
of the roll-offwaste market within one year and 43% within two years. See i&. When Browning-
Ferris was unable to buy out its only competition, the company reacted by trying to drive Kelco
out of business by cutting its price by 40% for all new business. See itt Browning-Ferris' regional
vice-president ordered the Burlington office to "put [Kelco] out of business. Do whatever it
takes. Squish him like a bug." Id. A salesman in the Burlington office was told to put Kelco
out of business, being instructed that if"it means give the stuffaway, give it away." I. at 260-61.
Kelco brought suit against Browning-Ferris alleging that Browning-Ferris' illegal pricing strategy
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. See i&. at 261. A Vermont jury found that Browning-
Ferris tried to monopolize the roll-off waste disposal market by interfering with Kelco's
contractual relations and awarded Kelco $51,000 in compensatory damages (later trebled) and
$6 million in punitive damages. See id. at 260-61.
86. See id. at 260. The court found this interpretation consistent with the intent of the
Framers, which was to place limits on the powers of the new government. See id. at 266.
87. i. at 264 (emphasis added).
88. See Stephen R. McAllister, A Pragmatic Approach to the Eighth Amendment and Punitive
Damages, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 761, 780-87 (1995) (arguing that Excessive Fines Clause should
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explicitly left open the question of whether a suit brought by a private
party in the name of the United States, in which the government
would share in any damage award, violates the Eighth Amendment.89
This issue has become increasingly important since a number of
states have passed legislation that apportion punitive damages
between the plaintiff and the state.90 In these states, a portion of the
punitive damage award must be paid either directly to the state's
treasury or into a state-sanctioned fund.9 Commentators long have
argued that punitive damages should be paid to the state or to a
public fund, or apportioned between the state and the plaintiff.92
Two reasons exist for awarding the state a portion of any punitive
award: (1) punitive damages are a windfall for the plaintiff;9  and
apply where states require that a percentage of a punitive damage award be paid into the state
treasury or to a state-sponsored fund).
89. See Browning-Fen'is, 492 U.S. at 276 n.21 ("We leave [this] question open for purposes
of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.").
90. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (repealed 1995) (one-third of all punitive
damage awards must be paid into state treasury); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)-(4) (West Supp.
1992) (thirty-five percent of punitive damage awards must be paid into state funds); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2) (1993 & Supp. 1997) (seventy-five percent of all punitive damage awards
are paid into state treasury); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 1996) (statute
allows trial court to apportion punitive damage award between plaintiff, his attorney, and State's
Department of Rehabilitation at its discretion); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (1)-(2) (West 1987)
(statute requires that seventy-five percent of punitive damage award be paid into civil fund);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1994) (fifty percent of all punitive damage awards in medical
malpractice cases must be paid into state treasury); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.675.2 (West Supp.
1992) (fifty percent of punitive damage award paid to the Tort Victims Compensation Fund);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp. 1995) (statute requires that 20% of punitive damage
awards be paid to state); OR. REV. ST. § 18.540 (1994) (after plaintiff's attorney fees have been
paid, 50% of remaining punitive damage award will go to state's Criminal Injuries Compensation
Fund); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (3) (1992) (after plaintiffs attorney fees and court costs have
been paid, 50% of punitive damage award in excess of $20,000 will go to state's General Fund).
In a 1992 amendment, the state of Florida reduced its portion of the punitive damage award
from 60% to 35% to prevent the state's take from discouraging lawyers who work on a
contingency basis from pursuing cases where the recovery would almost exclusively be punitive
damages (a case with low compensatory damages-such as an injured homemaker without lost
wages). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2) (b) (West Supp. 1992).
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., E.Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
839, 845-55 (1993) (arguing that windfalls from punitive damage awards could go directly to
states without undermining deterrent rationale); Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, The Feasibility
of Full State Extraction of Punitive Damage Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 301, 327-28 (1994) (arguing in
favor of awarding punitive damages directly to the state instead of the plaintiff). But seeJames
D. Ghiardi, Punitive Damages: State Extraction Practice Is Subject to Eighth Amendment Limitations, 26
TORT & INS. UJ. 119, 130-31 (1990) (maintaining that awarding punitive damages to state brings
these awards within purview of Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, which may result
in them being held unconstitutional).
93. The plaintiff already has received full compensation for her injuries through
compensatory damages. Allowing the plaintiff to keep a punitive damage award, therefore,
provides the plaintiff with a windfall. SeeRoginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841
(2d Cir. 1967) (denying punitive damage award when evidence was insufficient to meet New
York recklessness requirement and citing increased government regulation, criminal penalties,
and compensatory awards as sufficient deterance measures); Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553
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(2) punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant for a
public wrong, an offense against societal welfare.94 A few lower
courts have considered the propriety of state apportionment laws,
95
but the Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue.
What will the Supreme Court do with a case in which the punitive
award is apportioned between the state and the plaintiff? In light of
the wide-spread proliferation of state tort reform efforts to regulate
the procedures for imposing, assessing, and apportioning punitive
damages, punitive damages awarded in lawsuits between private
parties have become sufficiently governmental in character to invoke
Eighth Amendment scrutiny-if not for the entire award, at least for
the portion being paid to the state. Thus far, however, the Supreme
Court has rejected one opportunity (by denying certiorari) to
determine whether a state's sharing of a punitive damage
N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. App. 1996) ("State legislatures have imposed other reforms, such as
avoiding a windfall by requiring the punitive damages to be paid to the state rather than a
litigant."); see also Note, An Economic Analysis of Plaintiff's Windfallfrom Punitive Damage Litigation,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1907-08 (1992) (arguing that punitive damage awards create plaintiff
windfalls leading to inefficient economic results and proposing legislative response requiring
payment to state fund). But see Stevens, supra note 81, at 908 n.77 ("[T]he plaintiff is not
completely undeserving because she must expend time, effort, and money as the catalyst who
brings the defendant to justice for the sake of society.").
94. See Harris, supra note 22, at 1102 (stating that punitive damages are concerned with
injuries to community). Commentators also have argued that if the state were awarded all
punitive damage awards, it would increase the number of times parties settled and thereby
reduce litigation of these types of cases. See Stepanian, supra note 92, at 325-27. Full state
extraction enhances the incentive to settle because plaintiffs likely would settle for any amount
greater than their compensatory damages. This result is based on the premise that plaintiffs
would be able to keep the money in excess of compensatory damages, whereas that excess
amount would go to the state if the case went to trial. See id.
95. SeeMcBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563,1569-70,1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(finding that state statute allocating 75% of all products liability punitive damage awards to state
was a violation of Excessive Fines Clause and was a violation of due process and equal protection
because it applied only to product liability suits); Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 272
(Co. 1992) (holding that state statute that required one third of punitive damage award to be
paid to public treasury was unconstitutional taking under both United States and Colorado
Constitutions because punitive damage judgment is private property right); Gordon v. State, 585
So. 2d 1033, 1035-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), affid, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (finding Florida
provision apportioning punitive damage awards between plaintiff and state constitutional
because a plaintiff does not have a cognizable right to recover punitive damages); see also Burke
v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp. 1225, 1242 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (holding that state statute that
requires portion of punitive award to be paid to civil reparations fund administered by courts
does not provide state with any interest in award and, therefore, does not implicate Eighth
Amendment concerns), rev'd, 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993); Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins. Co.,
577 So. 2d 878, 887 (Ala. 1991) (Shores, J., concurring) (suggesting that court has inherent
power to apportion punitive damages between plaintiff and state general fund or "some special
fund that serves a public purpose or advances the cause ofjustice"); Shepard Components, Inc.
v. Brice Petrides-Donohoe & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (requiring 75% of
punitive damage award to be paid to state does not violate due process or equal protection
because plaintiffs do not have vested property rights in punitive damage awards).
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award-apportioned pursuant to a state statute-invokes Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.
6
Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to punitive damage awards
raises another question: What constitutes an excessive fine? Because
the Eighth Amendment prohibits only excessive fines, not all fines,
the Supreme Court would have to determine whether the portion of
a particular punitive award paid to the state is excessive. Such a
finding probably would require the Court to articulate "guideposts"
for determining what is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
Will the Supreme Court apply the same "guideposts" to determine
excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment that it articulated in
BMW,9 7 or will it craft even more factors for judges to consider? In
the past, the Court has refused to create a substantive federal
excessiveness standard, holding that "[a]lthough petitioners and their
amici would like us to craft some common-law standard of excessive-
ness that relies on notions of proportionality between punitive and
compensatory damages, or makes reference to statutory penalties for
similar conduct, these are matters of state, not federal, common
law."198
In light of the recent decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
where the Court expressed its willingness to overturn excessive awards
on a due process basis,9 9 the Excessive Fines Clause now seems
96. See Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Dudley, 667 So. 2d 783, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. C. 2498 (1996) (affirming without comment trial court verdict
awarding $4.06 million in compensatory damages, $8.25 million in punitive damages, and $3320
in plaintiff's costs in asbestos personal injury action).
97. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1591-92 (1996) (providing three
"guideposts" used to indicate the excessiveness of a punitive damage award: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio between plaintiff's compensatory damages
and the punitive damage award; and (3) the difference between the award and the civil or
criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable misconduct). The "guideposts"
articulated in BMWlook surprisingly similar to the considerations Justice O'Connor proposed
in her dissent in Browning-Ferris. Justice O'Connor stated:
First, the reviewing court must accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments
concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue. Second, the court should
examine the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the harshness of the award of
punitive damages. Third, because punitive damages are penal in nature, the court
should compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for
different types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by different
jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
98. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 279.
99. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595 ("Only when an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly
excessive'... does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
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unnecessary in the analysis of punitive damage awards."tu If the
total amount of the punitive damage award is not excessive under the
Due Process Clause, then a state's smaller share of that amount
logically cannot be excessive.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment-Can a Punitive Damage Award Violate
Due Process?
[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... 101
The Supreme Court has held that although the Double Jeopardy
and Excessive Fines Clauses do not apply to punitive damage awards
paid to private litigants, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does.
10 2
1. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 3 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the punitive damage award against a
challenge that the award violated due process."°  The Court ex-
plains:
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit in every case. We can say, however, that
general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from
the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the
constitutional calculus.10 5
100. In addition to its analysis under the Eighth Amendment, Brouming-Ferris is significant
for its foreshadowing of substantive due process review of punitive damage awards. Justice
Brennan,joined byJustice Marshall, issued a concurring opinion expressing his belief that the
Due Process Clause imposes both procedural and substantive limitations on punitive awards.
See Browning-Fenis, 492 U.S. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan actually
suggested the "grossly excessive" test, which subsequently was endorsed by the Court. See id. at
281 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, joined by justice Stevens, dissented on the
Excessive Fines Clause issue and agreed with Justice Brennan regarding the substantive
limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause. See id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
102. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
103. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
104. SeePacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) ("[W]e cannot say that the
common-law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as to deny due
process and be per se unconstitutional.").
105. Id.
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In Haslip, Lemmie L. Ruffin, an agent for Pacific Mutual, made a
proposal to supply health and life insurance for the employees of
Roosevelt City, Alabama." 6 The city approved the proposal and
began issuing payments, which were effected through deductions from
its employees' paychecks, to Ruffin."0 7 Instead of remitting these
payments to Union Fidelity, the health insurance company, Ruffin
misappropriated the money. 18 When the insurance company did
not receive the payments, it sent notices to Ruffin that it was
discontinuing health coverage to the city."
In 1982, Cleopatra Haslip, a city employee, was hospitalized and the
insurance company refused to cover the expenses.' Haslip, along
with other injured city employees, sued Ruffin and Pacific Mutual for
intentional fraud, alleging that Ruffin stole their insurance premiums
and allowed their policies to lapse."' The jury agreed, awarding
Haslip compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of
$1,040,000.112 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected
Pacific Mutual's claim that the punitive damage award was a product
of inadequate judicial review and a violation of due process and
upheld the punitive damage award."' The Supreme Court subse-
quently affirmed the state court's holding on appeal, again finding
that the requirements of due process had been met." 4 The Court
held that in order to determine "whether a punitive award is
reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and retribution," a court
should consider:
106. See id. at 4.
107. See id. at 5. An arrangement was made for Union Fidelity to send its billings for the
city's health insurance premiums to Ruffin at one of Pacific Mutual's branch offices. See itt
Once recieved, Ruffin was responsible for remitting the payments to Union Fidelity. See i&.
108. See id.
109. See id. The cancellation notices never were forwarded to the city. See id.
110. See id. The insurance company refused to extend coverage to Haslip and, as a result
of her inability to pay, her doctors placed the account with a collection agency, adversely
affecting Haslip's credit. See id
111. See it. Ruffin was sued individually and as a proprietorship, and Pacific Mutual was sued
under a theory of respondeat superior. See id.
112. See itt at 6-7. The jury was instructed that if it found the defendants liable for fraud,
it could award punitive damages to the plaintiff. See id. at 6. Thejury also was directed to take
into consideration "the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and
necessity of preventing similar harm" when fixing the amount. Id. at 6 n.1.
113. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537 (Ala. 1989), aff'd 499 U.S. 1
(1991). The Alabama Supreme Court determined that the trial judge appropriately had
reviewed the punitive damages awarded by the jury, held a hearing, and set forth on the record
the reasons why he felt the law did not authorize a remittur. See id at 543.
114. SeeHaslip, 499 U.S. at 21,23-24. "This appellate review makes certain that the punitive
damages are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what
has occurred and deter its repetition." Id at 21.
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(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive
damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's
conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration
of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and
the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the
desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also
sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all
the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on
the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and
(g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the
same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation."'
After Haslip, courts were left to determine whether the punitive
damage award was reasonable using the preceding "totality of the
circumstances" test.
2. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
In an effort to decide whether the punitive damage award in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp."6 was reasonable, the
Supreme Court of West Virginia engaged in a comparative analysis of
all post-Haslip court decisions searching for a pattern of what courts
find reasonable. The court placed the cases into three categories:
(1) "really stupid defendants;""
7 (2) "really mean defendants;"
118
and, (3) "really stupid defendants who could have caused a great deal
of harm by their actions but who actually caused minimal harm."" 9
The West Virginia court held that TXO fell within the "really mean"
category.
120
115. 1&. at 21-22. The Supreme Court reiterated the criteria set forth by the Alabama
Supreme Court in Hammond v. City of Godsen, 493 So. 2d 1374,1379 (Ala. 1986), for determining
whether a punitive award is excessive or inadequate. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
116. 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992), affjd; 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
117. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 888 (W. Va. 1992),
afld, 509 U.S. 443 (1993). According to the court, "really stupid defendants" are those who have
harmed victims unintentionally as a result of extreme carelessness. See id. The court held that
in those "really stupid" cases, punitive damages generally should be limited to five times the
compensatory damages. See id. at 889.
118. See id at 889. "Really mean defendants" are those who have committed intentional acts
that they knew were harmful. See id. The court held that in these cases, punitive damages that
are 500 times compensatory damages are not per se unreasonable. See id.
119. See id. at 887-88. The court held that when actual compensatory damages are minimal
and the potential for harm from defendant's stupidity was great, a punitive award exceeding five
times the compensatory award may be justified. See id at 889.
120. See id. Because the type of fraudulent action intentionally undertaken by the defendant
could have caused millions of dollars in damages to other victims, the court found the
defendant within the "really mean" category and, consequently, subject to substantial punitive
damages. See i.
15991997]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REvIEw [Vol. 46:1573
In this case, punitive damages were awarded to punish TXO for its
unscrupulous business dealings. TXO wanted oil and gas rights to a
1000-acre tract in West Virginia in which Alliance held a leasehold
interest.'2 ' After trying to purchase Alliance's rights without success,
TXO made Alliance a "phenomenal" offer on the condition that the
offer would be reduced if less than full oil and gas mineral and
leasehold rights were conveyed.122 TXO, looking for a way to
reduce its payments to Alliance, located a grant of some mineral
rights to a third party, Mr. Signaigo." As Mr. Signaigo explained
to TXO, however, the grant concerned only coal rights and, there-
fore, did not involve Alliance's oil and gas rights. 124 TXO tried to
force Mr. Signaigo to lie in an affidavit by claiming that the oil and
gas rights may have been included in the grant, but Mr. Signaigo
refused."z TXO, fully informed that the grant did not affect oil
and gas rights, then bought the grant and threatened Alliance with it,
trying to force Alliance to accept reduced royalties. 2 ' When
Alliance refused to comply, TXO brought suit and Alliance counter-
claimed.
127
At trial, Alliance demonstrated that TXO acted in bad faith because
it knew that it had no claim against Alliance for the oil and gas
rights.22 Alliance also offered evidence that TXO was a large
company; that the revenues from the oil and gas rights at issue were
substantial; and that TXO "had engaged in similar nefarious activities
in its business dealings in other parts of the country."'" The jury
found TXO at fault and awarded Alliance its actual damages totaling
$19,000, the costs of defending the TXO action, and $10 million in
punitive damages.13° The Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld
the award, stating:
121. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1993).
122. See id at 447 (quoting TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 875). TXO would pay Alliance $20 per acre
in cash, 22% of the oil and gas revenues in royalties, and all of the development costs as part
of the "phenomenal" offer. See id.
123. See id. at 448.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 449.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 449-50.
128. See id. at 450.
129. See id, at 450-51. Alliance introduced evidence that TXO had been caught in four
similar instances of fraud and misrepresentation preceding the activities in this case. See TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 881-83 (W. Va. 1992), aff'd 509 U.S.
443 (1993); see also Sandra L. Nunn, The Due Process Ramifications of Punitive Damages, 63 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1029, 1032 n.22 (1995) (discussing videotaped depositions of four attorneys concerning
matters in which TXO and each of its clients were involved).
130. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 451.
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The type of fraudulent action intentionally undertaken by TXO in
this case could potentially cause millions of dollars in damages to
other victims. As for the reprehensibility of TXO's conduct, we can
say no more than we have already said, and we believe the jury's
verdict says more than we could say in an opinion twice this length.
Just as important, an award of this magnitude is necessary to
discourage TXO from continuing its pattern and practice of fraud,
trickery and deceit."'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision, holding that the $10 million punitive damage award, which
was 526 times the actual damages, was not "grossly excessive" and thus
did not violate due process.3 2 As in Haslip, the Court refused to
adopt a bright line test, instead focusing on the "reasonableness" of
the punitive damages to determine whether the award was grossly
excessive.83 The Court rejected TXO's argument that the award
was unreasonable,'34 adding that it was appropriate to consider the
harm that could have occurred as a result of the defendant's conduct
when assessing the reasonableness of a punitive damage award. 5
By rejecting the notion that due process requires a particular ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, the Supreme Court in
Haslip and TXO left lower courts without concrete guidance as to what
constitutes an unreasonable award. To this point, the Court endorsed
a variety of factors used by state courts to assess and review punitive
damage awards, without articulating any sort of hierarchy among
them. Moreover, the court made clear that no single factor is
dispositive no matter how seemingly outrageous. 36 The Court held
that a "grossly excessive" award would violate due process, but left the
131. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 889-90. In deciding whether the $10 million punitive damage award
in this case met the "reasonable relationship" test under West Virginia law, the court considered
three factors: "(1) the potential harm that TXO's actions could have caused; (2) the
maliciousness of TXO's actions; and, (3) the penalty necessary to discourage TXO from
undertaking such endeavors in the future." Id, at 889.
132. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 462.
133. See id. at 458.
134. See id. at 462. The Supreme Court held that "the disparity between the punitive award
and the potential harm does not, in our view, 'jar one's constitutional sensibilities.'" Id. (quoting
Pacific Mut- Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)). The Court held that the "dramatic
disparity" is not dispositive in light of the potential harm to which Alliance was subject, TXO's
bad faith, TXO's wealth, and the fact that TXO had a long standing pattern of fraud, trickery,
and deceit. See id.
135. See id. at 460. The Supreme Court noted that the "shocking disparity" stressed by TXO
dissipates when one considers the possible loss of royalties payments to Alliance had TXO
succeeded in its wrongful plan. See id. at 462.
136. A "dramatic disparity" between actual damages and punitive damages (even one 526
times the actual damages) is not determinative of excessiveness in light of other factors involved
in the case. See id. at 459-62.
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courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular
punitive award was grossly excessive."8
3. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg
Not every punitive damage case has resulted in victory for the
plaintiff. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,1" for example, the Supreme
Court struck down an amendment to a state constitution that
prohibited judicial review of punitive awards as violative of due
process. 9 In Honda, Oberg brought a product liability suit against
Honda, who manufactured and sold three-wheeled all-terrain vehicles
that had a propensity to overturn-a fact that Honda knew or should
have known."4 When Oberg's vehicle overturned, he suffered
severe and permanent injuries.41 Thejury awarded Oberg $919,000
in compensatory damages, which was reduced to $735,000 because the
jury found that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the accident,
and $5 million in punitive damages.' Honda appealed, arguing
that the punitive award violated the Due Process Clause because it was
excessive and because Oregon courts lacked the authority to review
and correct excessive jury awards.' The Supreme Court held that
the amendment to the Oregon Constitution, which prohibited post-
verdictjudicial review of the amount of ajury award unless there was
no evidence to support the award, violated procedural due pro-
cess.14
Even though the Court reversed the punitive award on constitution-
al grounds, Honda has had little impact on punitive damage cases
because of the narrow holding and the unusual facts, in that Oregon
was the only state that barred post-verdict judicial review of punitive
damage awards. 45
137. See Nunn, supra note 129, at 1085 (recognizing that because the Supreme Court's line
of constitutional impropriety moves on a case-by-case basis, "[e ] xactly what will cause a punitive
damages award to cross this moving line in a given case remains unanswered").
138. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
139. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 435 (1994).




144. See id& at 430-32. Although Oregon provides pre-verdict safeguards against arbitrary
awards, the safeguards do not protect the defendant adequately from the possibility that juries
may disregard specific instructions and may impose excessive punitive damages. See id. at 429.
145. See id. at 426.
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4. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
The most recent due process challenge to a punitive damage award
was brought in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.'" In BMW, the
jury awarded the plaintiff $4000 in compensatory damages and $4
million in punitive damages because BMW failed to inform the
plaintiff that the "new" car they sold him had been partially refin-
ished.14 7 On appeal, the state supreme court reduced the punitive
damage award to $2 million." BMW appealed to the Supreme
Court, claiming that the punitive damage award was unconstitutional
because it was grossly excessive and because it constituted extraterrito-
rial punishment.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the $2 million
punitive damage award was so grossly excessive that it "transcend[ed]
the constitutional limit."5 ° Justice Stevens, writing for the five-
member majority, articulated three "guideposts" which the Court
considered in its due process calculus: (1) the degree of repre-
hensibility of the conduct; (2) the disparity between the harm
suffered by Gore and the punitive damage award; and, (3) the
difference between this remedy and the civil (and criminal) penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.1
5 '
146. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
147. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1593-94 (1996). Apparently, Gore
requested that the jury award punitive damages in the amount of $4000 for each of the
approximately 1000 partially refinished cars that BMW sold as new during a ten-year period,
even though many of these sales took place outside the state and in states where it was not
illegal to vithhold this information from the customer. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (No. 94-896), available in 1995 WL 126508.
148. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the jury
improperly included sales outside the state in computing the amount of punitive damages. See
i. The court held that the state could not punish BMW for acts that occurred outside state
borders. See id The court determined that a $2 million punitive damage award would be
"constitutionally reasonable" under the circumstances. See id.
149. See id. at 1592-93.
150. See id. at 1604. The Court held: "Only when an award can fairly be categorized as
'grossly excessive' in relation to [the state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence]
does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 1595.
151. See id. at 1598-99. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer, articulated seven factors that
appellate courts should use to determine whether a punitive damage award is grossly excessive:
(1) the award must bear a "reasonable relationship" to the harm that is likely to occur from
defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (2) the "degree of
reprehensibility" of defendant's conduct; (3) the award must "remove the profit" of the illegal
activity;, (4) the financial condition of the defendant; (5) the costs of the litigation and the
state's desire to encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial; (6) whether criminal sanctions
have been imposed; and (7) whether other civil actions have been filed against this defendant
for the same conduct. See id. at 1606-07 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989)).
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented on federalism
grounds." Justice Scalia, although agreeing that punitive damage
reform may be needed, believed that it was not the role of the Court
to impose its subjective assessment of reasonableness on the
states.' The Court's decision, according to Justice Scalia, "was
really no more than a disagreement with the community's sense of
indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the
Alabama jury." "s Justice Scalia did not believe that such an action
was authorized by the Due Process Clause's procedural guaran-
tees. 55  Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the lack of guidance the
decision gave to the states:
In truth, the "guideposts" mark a road to nowhere; they provide no
real guidance at all. As to "degree of reprehensibility" of the
defendant's conduct, we learn that "'nonviolent crimes are less
serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence,"'
and that "'trickery and deceit'" are "more reprehensible than
negligence." As to the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages,
we are told that a "'general concern of reasonableness ... enters
into the constitutional calculus,"-though even "a breathtaking 500
to 1" will not necessarily do anything more than "'raise a suspicious
judicial eyebrow.' And as to legislative sanctions provided for
comparable misconduct, they should be accorded "'substantial
deference."' One expects the Court to conclude: "To thine own
self be true."
These criss-crossing platitudes yield no real answers in no real
cases.
156
The legal effect of the "guideposts" articulated by the Court
establishes federal standards governing what traditionally has been the
exclusive province of the states. 7 In actuality, however, the Su-
preme Court's "guideposts" offer little real guidance.ss The Court
did not say that the articulated guideposts were the only factors for
consideration, leaving courts free to employ other factors when
152. See id at 1610 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated, "Since the Constitution does
not make that concern any of our business, the Court's activities in this area are an unjustified
incursion into the province of state governments." See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Ginsburg,joined by the ChiefJustice, also dissented on federalism grounds withJustice Ginsburg
arguing that the Court was encroaching on decisions more appropriately left to the states. See
id at 1614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 1610-11 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1611 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
155. See id. at 1611-12 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
156. See id. at 1612 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
157. See id. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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assessing the constitutionality of damage awards. 59  Moreover, the
vagueness of the guideposts lends further credence to the notion that
federal tort reform, where Congress can delineate the precise
penalties for selected improper behavior, is necessary.
6°
Although the first two guideposts, the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct and the relationship between the actual harm
and the punitive damages, long have been part of the punitive
damage assessment process in most states, the third guidepost, which
requires a comparison with statutory penalties, is relatively new.16'
Requiring that a punitive award bear some resemblance to statutory
penalties for similar conduct raises some concern because statutory
penalties often are outdated and obsolete. 6 Statutory penalties,
once fixed, rarely are adjusted for inflation. In fact, punitive damages
are generally most beneficial in areas where regulation is unable to
police or to keep abreast with advancement."6 The Supreme Court
in BMW however, apparently believed there should be some degree
of deference to legislative judgments concerning sanctions for
particular conduct.
The fact that criminal sanctions accompany potential civil sanctions
presents another impediment to a comparison of the statutorily
prescribed civil sanctions with punitive damage awards."6 How do
159. See BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1613 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that loophole in guideposts
will cause state courts to uphold large awards for the protection of consumers).
160. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (explaining why current system does not
work).
161. See Marcia Coyle, Punies Decision Gives Business Potent Ammo, NAT'L LJ.,June 3, 1996, at
All.
162. See infra notes 317-21 and accompanying text (explaining that statutory and regulatory
penalties offer only minimum standards and are often outdated because of rapidly changing
technology).
163. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61
TENN. L. REv. 1357, 1385 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, Prescription Products] (declaring that tort
system takes over when regulation fails). Regulation often is inadequate to police corporate
wrongdoing because: (1) regulatory agencies are understaffed and underfunded; (2) the
regulations are outdated; (3) there is generally a "lag time" between technological advances and
regulations to cover those advances; and (4) regulatory violations often are difficult to police.
The tort system in general and punitive damage awards in particular play a vital role in policing
corporate wrongdoing when the agencies and regulations fall short. See generaUy Teresa Moran
Schwartz, The Impact of the New Products Liability Restatement on Prescription Products, 50 FOOD &
DRUG LJ. 399, 405-06 (1995) [hereinafter Schwartz, Impact of the New Restatement] (describing
lack of clarity in current FDA regulations); Schwartz, Prescription Products, supra, at 1385-87
(explaining how regulations and tort system can work together to deter unsafe practices); Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335,1343-44 (1993)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Punitive Damages] (detailingjudicial treatment of regulations and listing
concerns about process); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1146-52 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Products Liability]
(articulating reasons why federal regulatory standards do not work).
164. See Lykowski, supra note 74, at 247 (citing factors that limit usefulness of comparison
with criminal penalties).
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criminal penalties for proscribed conduct factor into the civil penalty
comparison? Certainly, if criminal penalties exist for similar conduct,
the punitive award need not resemble the available civil penalty. How
does criminal incarceration translate into monetary sanctions? If a
defendant could be sentenced to five years in jail and $100,000,
should the punitive damage award be limited to the $100,000?
Commentators have observed the difficulty associated with comparing
criminal penalties to civil punishment.1"
The BMWdecision has spurred a great deal of debate over whether
federal tort reform is necessary now that the Court has struck down
a grossly excessive award."6 This Article argues that although BMW
is a milestone in the war against excessive damage awards, it will have
little actual impact in the trenches. District and appellate courts may
scrutinize awards more closely, but BMWis sufficiently amorphous to
provide no real guidance. 67 In fact, after the Supreme Court
rendered its decision in BMW, some expected the Court to remand
the pending sixteen cases for application of the guideposts."m The
Court only remanded a few cases for further consideration in light of
BMW, however, and denied certiorari in the rest, thereby leaving the
lower court rulings in effect. 69 The denial of certiorari lends
further credibility to the argument that BMWdid not change anything
operationally, and that federal tort reform is as necessary now as it was
before the BMW decision was rendered. 7 °
The Supreme Court simply is incapable of policing every excessive
punitive award, and because every state has its own standards and
regulations, there is very little predictability in the law.171 The
Supreme Court, which can do no more than overturn those awards
that constitute blatant violations of the Constitution, is not the
appropriate vehicle for tort reform. Reform must come from the
165. See id. (recognizing that tools such as maximum fine levels and imposition of fines per
incident give judges "infinite flexibity" when determining damage award).
166. See Peter A. Antonucci, BMW v. Gore: What Signal Is the Supreme Court Really Sending on
Punitive Damages?, Nov. 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 672396 (calling BMW and subsequent
cases "the vehicles that will drive the next chapter in the nation's battle to reform the tort
system").
167. Seesupra note 156 and accompanying text (describing why Supreme Court's guideposts
articulated in BMWare not helpful).
168. See Marcia Coyle, Court Disposes of Punitives Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1996, at A12
(speculating that cases with excessive awards would be remanded for application of guideposts).
169. The Court remanded Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996), Combustion Engg,
Inc. v. Johansen, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996), and Apache Corp. v. Moore, 116 S. Ct. 1843 (1996).
170. See Mark I. Levy, High Court Takes Care of Business, NAT' L.J., July 29, 1996, at C8
(suggesting that denial of review of cases means Justices see limits of decision).
171. SeeS. REP. No. 104-69, at 5-6 (1995) (calling current product liability litigation system
.a lottery").
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legislature, which is uniquely suited to balance the interests involved
and to weigh the benefits of the punitive damages system against its
abuse.
172
5. Undecided due process challenges-multiple punitive damage awards
With the exception of the due process questions raised and
answered by the Supreme Court in BMW, the Court has left a number
of due process concerns unresolved. One such issue is whether
multiple punitive damage awards against a single defendant for the
same act or course of conduct violates due process. The threat of
multiple punitive damage awards against a single defendant arises
most frequently in the context of mass torts evident with products
such as asbestos, 173 Agent Orange, 74 the Ford Pinto, 75 and the
Dalkon Shield.
76
Imposition of multiple punitive damage awards for the same act
poses a number of serious problems. If early plaintiffs are awarded
large punitive damage amounts, they could render the defendant
bankrupt and unable to adequately compensate later plaintiffs for
actual damages.'77 In addition, multiple punitive awards discourage
the development of new and potentially valuable products. 78 The
172. See id. at 14 (stating that only federal legislation can create uniformity necessary in
liability system).
173. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1982) (awarding
punitive damages to insulation installer for disease suffered due to asbestos).
174. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 773-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(barring chemical companies that produced Agent Orange from seeking contribution or
indemnification from federal government).
175. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 820 (1981) (awarding damages
to individuals severely burned in Ford Pinto).
176. See In re Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982).
177. SeeNote, Class ActionsforPunitiveDamages, 81 MICH. L REv. 1787, 1791 (1983) (viewing
multiple punitive damage awards as harmful because defendants' assets may be exhausted
prematurely). Judge William W. Schwarzer explained to Congress how this problem may exist
presently in asbestos litigation:
There are now some 100,000 asbestos cases pending in federal and state courts, and
it is expected that over the next ten years an equal number will be filed. Considering
that nearly every one of these cases includes a prayer for punitive damages, should
such damages be awarded in many of these eases, the aggregate amount would be far
in excess of what the defendants would be able to pay. Even without considering
punitive damages, the compensation claims alone currently exceed the aggregate assets
of the asbestos industry.-
Asbestos Litigation Crisis in Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property andJudicial Admin. of the House Comm. on thejudiciary, 102d Cong. 137 (1992) (statement
ofJudge William W. Schwartzer, Director, Federal Judicial Center) (footnote omitted).
178. SeeJudith Camile Glasscock, Comment, Emptying the Deep Pocket in Mass Tort Litigation,
18 ST. MAt's L.J. 977, 993 (1987) (listing discontinuation of beneficial products as possible
outcome of multiple punitive awards).
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possibility of multiple awards also impedes settlements and forces
higher settlements than the defendant should pay, because each
plaintiff has an incentive to wait for the windfall generated by a
punitive award.
The Third Circuit recently addressed the constitutionality of
multiple punitive awards in Dunn v. Hovic179 In Dunn, the plaintiff
was injured by asbestos products manufactured by the defendant,
Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corporation ("OCF").' The district
court awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in compensatory damages and $2
million in punitive damages.
18'
On appeal to the Third Circuit, OCF argued that repeated
imposition of punitive damages for the same act was an arbitrary
deprivation of property without due process and violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.18 2  Although the appeals court rejected
OCF's due process argument,"a it held that corporate defendants
may introduce evidence of past punitive awards imposed on them for
the jury to consider when assessing the amount of punitive damages
that should be awarded in the present case.'8 4 The Third Circuit,
like many other courts, expressed the need for legislation to address
the national issue of multiple punitive damage awards."a
Considering the inappropriateness of repetitive punitive damage
awards, Professor Gary T. Schwartz has argued that the Due Process
Clause should incorporate the prohibition against double jeopardy of
179. 1 F.3d 1371 (3d Cir. 1993).
180. See Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F. Supp. 929, 933-34 (D.V.l. 1991).
181. See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1373 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit remitted the
punitive award to $1 million. See id.
182. See id. at 1374.
183. See id. at 1389 (ruling that evidence produced by defendant fell short of due process
violation).
184. See id. at 1391 (suggesting that "punitive damages overkill" can be solved by scrutinizing
past awards paid and ability of defendant to pay future awards). The defendant, however, may
not always want to admit evidence concerning other punitive awards that have been imposed.
On the one hand, evidence of prior awards of punitive damages could persuade the jury that
the defendant already has received sufficient punishment for his act and that no further
deterrence is necessary. SeeJohnA.. Albers, Note & Comment, State of Confusion: Substantive and
Procedural Due Process with Regard to Punitive Damages After TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 26 U. ToL L. REv. 159, 201 (1994) (acknowledging that previous punitive
damage award payouts may promote sympathy for defendants). On the other hand, such
evidence could infuriate the jury, demonstrating to them just how egregious others perceive the
defendant's acts to be. See Dennis N. Jones, Multiple Punitive Damage Awards for a Single Course
of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National Poliy to Protect Due Process, 43 AL'.. L REV. 1, 29-30
(1991) (noting thatjury might decide to award similarly high damages).
185. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1386 ("[N]o single court can fashion an effective response to the
national problem flowing from mass exposure to asbestos products."); see also Fischer v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 480 (NJ. 1986) (admitting that courts are powerless in this area);
Davis v. Celotex Corp., 4 2 0 S.E.2d 557,565-66 (W. Va. 1992) (discussing unfairness in allowing
courts to determine punitive damages).
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the Fifth Amendment, like it does the prohibition against excessive
fines from the Eighth Amendment; therefore, multiple punitive
awards could be a violation of due process.18 6 As another commen-
tator stated, "[Ait some point, justifiable punishment ends and
overkill begins."8 7 There should be safeguards implemented to
prevent such repeated punishment.
Whether the aggregate of all punitive awards against a single
defendant for a single act would be grossly disproportionate to the
misconduct and thereby violate due process is an appropriate matter
for federal legislators. As the following discussion explains, neither
the judiciary nor the state legislatures are capable of effectively
regulating against the imposition of multiple punitive awards.
Despite their concern about a defendant's due process rights,
courts thus far have been unwilling to articulate a "one bite" or a
"first comer" rule, citing both their inability to prevent other
jurisdictions from awarding punitive damages and their concern about
whether the firstjury is capable of granting a single award to account
fully for the defendant's misconduct."s Because the punitive
damage award should be based in part on the amount of injury the
defendant has caused and this information may not be known fully at
the time of the assessment of the first punitive award, a "first comer"
186. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 VmL. L REv. 415,
422-23 (1994). Professor Schwartz argued:
This inappropriateness is seen as rooted in our legal system's norm against double
jeopardy - let alone multiple jeopardy... United States v. Halperseemingly indicates
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not pertain to private suits seeking punitive
damages. Yet, whatever the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause, when a punitive
damage award becomes sufficiently excessive, it violates the substantive norms included
in the Due Process Clause. (This point was raised by the Court as a possibility in
Browning-Ferris, and was confirmed by the Supreme Court's later opinions in Paczfie
MutualLifeInsurance v. Haslip and TXO.) Similarly, the core of the prohibition against
double jeopardy is probably included in the Due Process guarantee.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
187. See Seltzer, supra note 26, at 55.
188. SeeJuzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D.NJ. 1989) (citing
diversity of treatment by courts as reason not to have one-award rule), rew'd sub nom. Juzwin v.
Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court pointed out:
[T] his court does not have the power or the authority to prohibit subsequent awards
in other courts, notwithstanding its opinion that such subsequent awards violate the
due process rights of the defendants against whom such verdicts are entered. Until
there is uniformity either through Supreme Court decision or national legislation, this
court is powerless to fashion a remedy which will protect the due process rights of this
defendant or other defendants similarly situated.
Id. Congress once considered enacting a national "first comer" statute, but ultimately rejected
this legislation because the first punitive award assessed against a defendant may not punish it
sufficiently for its misconduct. SeeS. 44, 98th Cong. § 12f (1984).
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rule may not punish the defendant adequately for her miscon-
duct a The first award may be low because the extent of actual
damages to all injured parties may not be known at the time of the
first case to consider punitive awards."t Moreover, if new evidence
of wrongdoing on the part of the defendant is discovered after the
first punitive award, it would be inappropriate not to permit the
imposition of more than one award.191 Courts repeatedly have
urged a national legislative solution to the punitive damage problems
because no single court has the power to prohibit subsequent awards
in other courts.192
Similarly, individual state legislatures cannot prevent the imposition
of multiple punitive awards for a single act because a state's power to
regulate conduct stops at its borders. 93 For example, Georgia's tort
law permits only one punitive award for any act regardless of the
189. SeeJuzwin, 718 F. Supp. at 1235 (realizing that jury instructions stating that punitive
award must relate to actual harm suffered directly conflicted with "first-comer" statute that
accounts for all of defendant's misconduct). Although it seems unfair that the first plaintiff gets
the entire punitive damage award, the first plaintiff has the heaviest burden in bringing suit.
Once the first plaintiff blazes a trail, it will be easier for others to follow. A punitive damage
award is not a reward or compensation; it is not earned by the plaintiff. Rather, it is a punitive
sanction against the defendant for misconduct.
190. See id. (recognizing impossiblity of ensuring that one award covers all of defendant's
misconduct).
191. SeeVictor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, The American Law Institute's Reporters'Study on
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: A Timely Calfor Punitive Damages Reform, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 263, 281 (1993) (advocating proposal in which subsequent claimants could seek punitive
damages only by presenting new evidence of defendants' "conscious and deliberate miscon-
duct"); see also Punitive Damages Hearing, supra note 24, at 100 (testimony of Victor E. Schwartz,
Esq., General Counsel, American Tort Reform Association) (agreeing with Senator Hatch's
proposed solution to problem of multiple damage awards). Such evidence could include the
fact that the defendant destroyed or hid damning evidence in the first trial. See id. at 102
(allowing further punishment of defendant in such instances).
192. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,472 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that punitive damage reform should be undertaken by "the proper
institutions of our society," legislatures, not courts); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 39 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that state and federal legislatures should work to
restrict punitive damages); Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371,1399 (3d Cir. 1993) (WeisJ., dissenting)
("Unquestionably, a national solution is needed."); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1017
(6th Cir. 1993) (noting that relief from multiple punitive awards should be sought from
legislature, not courts); Glasscockv. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d 1085, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1991)
(realizing problems in law as it stands); Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 911 F.2d 1151,
1155 (5th Cir. 1990) ("If no change occurs in our tort or constitutional law, the time will arrive
when [a defendant's] liability for punitive damages imperils its ability to pay compensatory
claims and its corporate existence."), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300
(1995);Juzwin, 718 F. Supp. at 1235 (urging national legislation or Supreme Court decision to
promote uniformity and protect due process rights), W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d
502,505 (Fla. 1994) (noting that the only "realistic solution" to imposition of multiple punitive
awards is "federal legislation").
193. SeeJohn Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality ofPunitive Damage Awards,
72 VA. L. REV. 139, 147 (1986) (explaining that repetitive nature of damages cannot be stopped
unless national solution is attempted).
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number of separate causes of action that might arise from that
act." Although this may aid corporations being sued in Georgia,
it has no bearing on actions brought in other states. 95 Plaintiffs
could avoid the Georgia statute simply by bringing their action
elsewhere.
D. The Seventh Amendment-Does Judicial Review ofJury Verdicts For
Excessiveness Violate the Re-Examination Clause?
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.196
The most recent constitutional challenge to a jury's verdict on
damages, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,97 did not, like most
of the recent decisions, address such issues as when an award is
excessive or which factors should be used in making this determina-
tion. Instead, Gasperini pertained to the constitutionality of appellate
review of the excessiveness of damage awards. 9
The Gasperini appeal stemmed from a jury award of $450,000 in
damages to a photographer when the Center for Humanities, a
company that produces educational videos, lost 300 slide transparen-
cies after producing his video.19' The Second Circuit found the
damage award excessive and ordered the photographer to accept a
remitted award of $100,000 or suffer through a new trial on damag-
es.2
00
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Gasperini contended that the
appellate court's remittitur was a violation of his Seventh Amendment
rights. 01 The Supreme Court held that, as long as the standard of
review was "abuse of discretion," appellate review of the district court's
194. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e) (1) (Supp. 1996); see alsoMO. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4)
(West Supp. 1997) (crediting defendant with prior punitive damage payments).
195. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... ."); see also PunitiveDamages Hering, supra
note 24, at 100 (testimony of Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., General Counsel, American Tort Reform
Association) (noting that Congress should respond to the request by "federal and state judges,
as well as state legislators," for multiple punitive damages fairness legislation).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
197. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
198. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2215 (1996).
199. SeeGasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 66 F.3d 427,428 (2d Cir.) (awarding $1500
for each lost slide), vacated 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996).
200. See id at 431.
201. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2215 (questioning whether New York's practice of appellate
review ofjury awards is compatible with Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury).
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findings regarding excessive damages was reconcilable with the
Seventh Amendment.
20 2
The Court also considered whether federal courts in diversity cases
should use a federal standard,03 which is extremely deferential to
jury verdicts, or a state standard,2 °4 which is less deferential to jury
verdicts, to determine whether a jury award is excessive. 205  The
Court held that New York's standard used to check excessive damages
should be applied by the federal court to avoid state and federal
courts in the same jurisdiction reaching different conclusions on the
same issues.0 6 Thus, the district court was charged with determin-
ing whether the jury's verdict "materially deviated" from reasonable
compensation, and the appellate court reviews the district court's
application of this test for an abuse of discretion.20 7
Unlike the substantive due process cases, Gaspeiniinvolved an issue
that certainly was within the province of the judiciary and has been
resolved with relative ease, clarity, and precision. Substantive due
process, on the other hand, lacks clarity and precision because it
requires the Court to analyze excessiveness on a case-by-case basis.
The judiciary is ill-equipped to address problems requiring it to assess
a community's sense of outrage or social conscience.
202. See id. at 2222-24. Gasperini was a major victory for the business community. Had the
Court held that appellate review was not constitutional, there would be virtually no check on
unbridled power of juries to award unjustified amounts of punitive damages. In 1992, an
exhaustive punitive damage study of the 355 punitive damage awards in product liability cases
over the 25 years preceding 1992 found that more than half of all punitive awards were
appealed, and that more than half of those appealed were reversed or reduced. See Rustad,
supra note 50, at 57. Absent the check of judicial review/remittitur, all of the awards
determined to be unreasonable and excessive would have stood.
203. See Gasperin, 116 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (citing "shock the conscience" as federal standard).
204. See id. (citing "deviates materially" as N.Y. state standard). In its 1986 effort to reform
tort law, New York codified a standard ofjudicia review on the size ofjury verdicts. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995). According to the NewYork legislature, the federal "shock
the conscience" test was an insufficient check on damages awards. Therefore, NewYork enacted
a standard that would invite more careful appellate scrutiny of damage awards: "the appellate
division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from
what would be reasonable compensation." I&
205. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2219-24 (examining Erie doctrine and ruling that Seventh
Amendment does not preclude federal courts from using "deviates materially" standard).
206. See id. at 2220-21 (acknowledging that the "twin aims" of the Erie doctrine, "discourage-
ment of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws," forces such
a decision (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965))). Although the state law was
procedural, the state's objective in enacting the law was substantive. See id. at 2220. If the
federal courts continued to apply the federal standard to cases arising out of New York law,
there would be a substantial difference in the outcome of the cases, thereby implicating the twin
aims of Erie See i&.
207. See id. at 2220-21 (stating that "abuse of discretion" is standard currently used by federal
circuits when faced with assertion of inadequacy or excessiveness).
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V. FEDERAL TORT REFORM LEGISLATION
The public's perception that punitive damages are "running wild"
and "skyrocketing" has given rise to a call for national tort reform.
Federal tort reform supporters claim that the interstate nature of
product sales, as well as the inability of states to regulate conduct
outside their boundaries, makes federal legislation appropriate and
necessary."8 The goal of the recently proposed national tort reform
legislation is to protect corporate manufacturers from excessive
punitive damage awards.2" Proponents of national tort reform
claim that punitive damages have the potential to cripple U.S.
industry and thereby inhibit their competitiveness in the global
market.
10
A. The Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act
Federal tort reform legislation has been considered by Congress in
every year since 1982.211 Recently, House Bill 956, labeled "The
Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996," passed
both Houses of Congress.212 House Bill 956, which would have
applied to all product liability actions,213 would have reformed tort
208. See Robert Bork & Theodore Olson, Commentary, Trial Lauyers and Other Closet
Federalists, WASH. TwIEs, Mar. 9, 1995, at A21 (explaining that "litigation explosion disregards
state lines"). Congressional power to regulate punitive damage awards in products liability cases
comes from the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have the
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... ").
209. See S. REP. No. 104-69, at 1-2 (1995) (charging current liability system with stifling
innovation and with keeping beneficial products off market).
210. See id. at 2 (explaining that American companies are hampered by liability system when
competing in global market). Research and development in American industry are being halted
or discouraged by the threat of excessive punitive damage awards, thereby making American
businesses less competitive in the international market. Consequently, the punitive damages
problem is a direct threat to the economic stability ofcorporate America. See id. at 10-11; see also
141 CoNG. REc. S6398 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Glenn) (advocating that
legislation is needed to reform system). But see Product Liability Fairness Hearing, supra note 24,
at 505 (statement of Stephen Daniels, Ph.D., American Bar Foundation) (challenging notion
thatpunitive damages are source of problem). Proponents also claim thatultimately, consumers
are paying for excessive punitive damage awards as companies will pass the burden onto the
consumer in the form of higher prices for their goods and services. See 141 CONG. REC. S6397
(daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici) (noting that Americans no longer can
afford to pay tort tax).
211. See S. REP. No. 104-69, at 14-17 (1995) (providing history of tort reform legislation in
Congress).
212. See H.R 956, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Otto G. Obermaier & Lee Dranikoff,
Congresional Legislation Seeks Litigation Reform, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 23, 1995, at S1 (listing different
pieces of legislation recently passed by Congress).
213. See H.R. 956 § 2(b) (setting forth purposes of Act). If tort reform is as urgent as
proponents claim, then it should be applicable to all cases in which punitive damages can be
assessed. In 1996, product liability actions represented only 10% of all federal civil cases filed.
See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
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law radically by preempting state law in what traditionally has been an
area of state regulation. 14 It recommended raising the burden of
proof to "clear and convincing evidence"215 and articulated a single
standard for awarding punitive damages: the defendant's conduct
would have to exhibit "a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights
or safety of others."216 The bill also placed a cap on punitive
damage awards21 and would have permitted either party to bifur-
cate the trial of punitive damages from liability and compensatory
damages.21 President Clinton, however, vetoed H.R. 956 on May
2, 1996.219
Table C-2A, at 138 (1996). Limiting these reforms to product liability actions thus would not
have the widespread impact some might expect.
214. See H.R. 956, § 102. The federal bill would not have preempted more restrictive state
laws. See id § 108(b) (3) (D). The federal bill would have set only the minimum standards for
reforming punitive damage awards. If the state law were more restrictive of punitive awards-for
instance, if a state had a higher burden of proof, like Colorado where the burden is beyond a
reasonable doubt, or if it had a lower cap, like Virginia where all punitive damage awards are
capped at $350,000-then the more restrictive state law would have continued to prevail in that
jurisdiction. There was no logical reason supporting such a one-sided application of law.
Certainly, the federal legislature was not doing this to preserve state sovereignty, because the bill
would have preempted all those states which had less restrictive laws. Moreover, such a provision
would have undermined the uniformity and predictability that would have been created by
enacting a national law. A federal law would be most beneficial if it preempts all state laws, both
those that are more restrictive and those that are more lenient. If the federal legislature insisted
upon this one-sided preemption, however, it should have limited the law to cut-and-dry issues
such as the amount of the cap, as opposed to issues involving more discretion and potential
ambiguity such as the liability standard.
215. See id. § 108(a) (awarding punitive damages only if there is "clear and convincing"
evidence of defendant's misconduct).
216. Id.
217. See id. § 108(b) (placing cap on punitive damage awards of two times economic and
noneconomic loss or $250,000, whichever is greater).
218. See id. § 108(c) (permitting either party to request a separate proceeding, to be held
after the determination of the amount ofcompensatory damages, on whether to award punitive
damages and the amount of the award).
219. SeeVeto Message from the President, 142 CONG. REG. H4425 (daily ed. May 6, 1996).
Many claim that Clinton is controlled by the American trial lawyers who do not want to limit
runawayjuries because it would reduce their earnings. SeeJohn F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes Products
Liability Measur" Move Ttiggers Barrage of Accusations Between White House and Hill Republicans,
WASH. Posr, May 3, 1996, at A14 (quoting Bob Dole as saying, "It is the trial lawyers who are
calling the shots at the White House."); see alsoJohn E. Yang, House Fails to Override Liability Veto,
WASH. PosT, May 10, 1996, at A23 (charging President Clinton with putting interests of trial
lawyers before other Americans). Some also claim that the Republicans were not pushing tort
reform very hard because it was an important GOP fund-raising tool, and in an election year,
they wanted the manufacturers' lobby to keep funneling money their way. See T.R. Goldman,
Tort Reform: What Happened, What's Next, LEGAL TIMES, July 8, 1996, at 1 (quoting GOP House
staffer as saying, "If federal tort reform efforts had concluded in 1995 the influence of trial
lawyer money on the Democratic presidential campaign would have been seriously eroded, and
with it, a lucrative GOP fund-raising tool as well.").
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B. Why Do We Need Federal Tort Reform?
Federal tort reform is necessary to safeguard against undeserved
and excessive awards and to protect the defendant, the public, and
the integrity of the judicial process.22° Reform is necessary to
combat the vagueness in determinations of liability and assessments
of amounts of punishment.221 Such vagueness leaves juries without
guidance, inviting them to make improper awards based on their
personal biases and prejudices.2 22  Moreover, not only are each
state's liability and damage assessment standards vague, they are all
different-resulting in 49 different laws for a manufacturer to adhere
to. The application of the patchwork of state laws and vague
standards which make up the punitive damage system has been erratic
at best. This uncertainty has been unfair both to consumers who
never can be certain of their rights and to manufacturers who never
can be sure of their responsibilities.2
A single, uniform law of punitive damages would reduce the
number of punitive damage claims being brought and reduce
transaction costs. If both plaintiffs and manufacturers can recognize
legitimate claims against a manufacturer, the number of frivolous suits
brought will be reduced and settlement will be encouraged.
Predictability and uniformity of result are of particular importance in
220. The use of, and demand for, excessive awards as a social reform tool has become too
wide-spread. Multimillion dollar punitive awards have become the rule rather than the
exception and as such, area threat to the viability of the manufacturing community and the
stability of American industry.
221. See Ellis, supra note 27, at 34-53 (arguing that vague punitive damage standards and
broadjury discretion is unfair and inefficient).
222. See id. at 56 (stating that uncertain criteria for arriving at punitive amounts invariably
will lead to unpredictability and disparate awards); Owen, supra note 31, at 384 (noting that
standards for determining defendant's liability and assessing punitive damages are too vague).
223. The current punitive damage system leaves manufacturers without any definite notion
of what conduct is prohibited and what punishment will be imposed. See Nadine E. Roddy,
Punitive Damages in Strict Products Liability Litigation, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 347 (1981)
(noting that manufacturers often contend that standards for punitive damages do not give
proper notice). Without a clear idea of what conduct is prohibited, manufacturers cannot alter
their behavior in order to be law abiding. As one commentator noted:
People cannot obey the law unless they know it; they cannot know the law unless they
know which law to learn. If I am to know the law that governs an act or transaction,
I must be able to identify, before I act, the one state empowered to govern. It is no
answer to say that I can usually comply with the more restrictive rule, because that
eliminates the political authority of the more permissive state. Nor is it an answer to
say that I do not need to know rules of compensation, loss allocation, and the like. I
believe that one should generally obey the applicable law even if the sanctions for
violation are light, but this view is not universally shared. If we give even a little
credence to the insights of law and economics, my need to know the law extends to
rules that specify the consequences of compliance and violation.
Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 319 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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areas where the parties are likely to give advance thought to the legal
consequences of their actions. 24 Without certainty and predictabili-
ty, the efficacy of punitive damage awards will be undermined
substantially."z
Moreover, the integrity of the judicial system is threatened when
there is unpredictability in the law and its application.22 Instability
in the law and its application breeds discontent and disrespect for the
law which, in turn, erodes public confidence in the legal process. 27
In addition, the current patchwork of state laws increases forum
shopping.2 8 Because manufacturers generally sell their products
across state lines,21 suits could be brought in many states. In-
formed plaintiffs simply bring suits in states that have more consumer-
friendly laws. National legislation would solve this problem by
creating a single standard of liability.
By clarifying the muddled state laws, federal tort reform would
provide more certainty and predictability. The goals of punitive
damages-punishment and deterrence-would be furthered if the law
were made more exact, definite, and predictable. Manufacturers
would be able to predict, by reference to pre-existing situations which
had been resolved, what conduct is prohibited. The implementation
224. See In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 730 n.29 (4th Cir. 1989).
Two goals of tort law should be predictability and uniformity. As a practical matter,
until the legality of a particular course of conduct has been adjudicated, potential
defendants are guided only by a general standard... and by analogous cases decided
under that standard. What may appear to be inconsistent adjudications in similar
situations can generally be rationalized because of differences in the facts. But if
various fact finders reach inconsistent conclusions about the same set of facts, the
defendant (and others in similar circumstances) is left without any guidance
concerning the legality of its conduct, which may serve important legitimate aims.
Id.
225. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive DamagesforDeterence. Wen and How Much?, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 1143, 1145 (1989) (mentioning that uncertain punitive damages are neither fair nor
efficient).
226. Martin A. Rioter, Reappraising theJuy's Role as a Finder of Fac 20 GA. L. REy. 123, 127
(1985) (discussing idea that unpredictability impairs judicial process).
227. SeeFRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 78 (1944) ("One could write
a history of the decline of the Rule of Law... in terms of the progressive introduction of these
vague formulas into legislation and jurisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness and
uncertainty of, and the consequent disrespect for, the law and the judicature."); see alsoJason
Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76
CORNiLL L REv. 341, 341 (1991) (noting that certainty is central concern of modem
jurisprudence); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 136-37 (1992) (stating
that law involves search for order and predictability); Roscoe Pound,Justice According to Law, 13
COLuM. L REv. 696, 705 (1913) (arguing that society administers justice according to law by
fixing standards that individuals may determine prior to controversy, thereby providing
reasonable assurance that all individuals receive similar treatment).
228. SeeNote, Forum Shoeing Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1689 (1990) (stating that
forum shopping is caused by disparate results among various state systems).
229. Seventy percent of all products manufactured are sold in other states. See 142 CONG.
REC. S2560 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
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of federal legislation ultimately would provide manufacturers with
more notice as to both the prohibited conduct and the severity of the
punishment 23° Through repeated application, the federal standard
would become increasingly definite and would clarify the conduct that
is prohibited, thereby reducing the need for litigation.
Federal tort reform would also establish, on a national level, the
safeguards necessary to ensure against abuse of the punitive damages
sanction. The quasi-criminal nature of the punitive damages doctrine
demands safeguards that are not normally associated with damages
awarded in the civil context.23 ' The criminal law has built-in
protections to prevent excessive punishment in a single proceeding
(the Excessive Fines Clause) 2 2 or multiple punishments assessed in
different proceedings for the same act (the Double Jeopardy
Clause) .233 Federal tort reform could create the appropriate
safeguards to identify and address the problems that plague the
punitive damages doctrine.
C. Federal Tort Reform Proposal
1. The burden of proof-clear and convincing evidence
As proposed in the federal bill and the Model Act, the burden of
proof necessary to prove entitlement to punitive damage awards
should be "clear and convincing" evidence.29  Because punitive
damages are "quasi criminal,"23 5 standing somewhere between tort
and criminal law, it seems appropriate to apply an intermediate
evidentiary burden of proof. The purpose of tort law is to compen-
sate victims (restitutionary),236 using a "preponderance of the
evidence" burden of proof, which means that the plaintiff need prove
only that it is more likely than not that the defendant committed the
230. The notions of fairness and justice require that individuals have notice as to what
constitutes socially reprehensible conduct and as to the punishment for non-compliance. See
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-99 (1996) (explaining that fairness under
Constitution requires notice of possible punishment).
231. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing why punitive damages may be
described as "quasi-criminal"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 80,59 (1983) (RehnquistJ., dissenting)
(discussing special legal categorization for punitive damages).
232. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
233. See discussion supra Part IVA
234. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(a) (1996); Model Act, supra note 9, § 5(2).
235. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text; see also Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1810-13 (1992)
(analyzing distinctions between criminal and civil penalties).
236. But see Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the "Cisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions
of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 766 (1987) (rejecting restitutionary aspect of tort law,
instead proposing dispute resolution as essential function of tort law).
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alleged act. The purpose of criminal law is to punish and deter
(retributive), using a "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof,
which means that the prosecutor must prove that there is no
reasonable question that the defendant committed the act.3 7 Like
criminal sanctions, punitive damages are awarded to victims to punish
and deter misconduct; but like tort awards, they are awarded in a civil
suit to the plaintiff. It makes sense, therefore, that the burden of
proof for punitive damages lie somewhere in between the burden for
criminal sanctions and the burden for tort awards.
The "clear and convincing" evidence standard, which is a lighter
burden than "beyond a reasonable doubt" but heavier than proving
by a preponderance of the evidence, falls within this intermediate
ground. Clear and convincing evidence is "that measure or degree of
proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief
or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be estab-
lished."2" The clear and convincing evidence burden of proof
should be adopted as a safeguard for the defendant's rights in
recognition of the criminal component of the penalty and to offset
potential bias in favor of the plaintiff and against the corporate
manufacturer.
2. The liability standard-"a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights
or safety of others"
2 9
Under the current rubric of punitive damages, every state has a
different way of characterizing and defining what form of conduct
gives rise to the imposition of punitive damage awards.2" Pursuant
to the various state tort reform statutes, punitive damages can be
awarded when the defendant's conduct was grossly negligent,
intentional, willful, wanton, malicious, reckless, outrageous or when
the defendant exhibited a flagrant disregard for others. 2 1  Most
237. See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
238. H.R. 956, § 101(4).
239. Id § 108(a) (emphasis added).
240. Seeinfra notes 241-42 (providing examples ofdiffering approaches to punitive damages).
241. Alabama's statute, for example, permits punitive damages "in a tort action where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged
in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a)
(1993 & Supp. 1996). Florida's statute permits punitive damages for "willful, wanton, or gross
misconduct." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). Georgia allows
punitive damages when "defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud,
wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of
conscious indifference to consequences." GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (1982 & Supp. 1997).
Illinois allows for punitive damage awards only when the "defendant's conduct was with evil
motive or with reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and
with a conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others." ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/2-
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states, however, offer no definition of these vague terms.' Having
so many different standards for defining prohibited conduct makes it
much more difficult for corporations who do business in many states
to determine the character and nature of the prohibited conduct.
Although commentators may bicker over which standard should
define the nature of the conduct that gives rise to punitive damage
awards, no one can dispute the value of having a single national
definition for this conduct. The proposed federal standard in the
most recent bill described actions deserving punitive damage awards
as those that are "carried out by the defendant with a conscious,
flagrant indifference to the safety of others."2" The passage of a
federal bill to regulate the imposition of punitive damage awards
nationally would provide a single uniform definition. Certainly, a
uniform standard would provide more reliability and predictability
than the current menagerie of standards promulgated, yet undefined,
by the many states. Moreover, through its application, the single
standard would become increasingly definite over time, making the
class of prohibited conduct increasingly clear and reducing the need
for litigation. 44
A "flagrant indifference" standard would require a degree of
intentional action not present in some current state statutes that allow
punitive damages for simple or gross negligence. Intent should be a
necessary element in order to justify punitive damages.2'4 The
1115.05(b) (West 1993). Mississippi permits the imposition of punitive damages for a wide
range of conduct; the plaintiff must prove "that the defendant against whom punitive damages
are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or
reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-
65(1) (a) (Supp. 1996). Perhaps the broadest of all states' tort reform laws, Mississippi's statute
allows punitive damages upon proof of anything from "actual malice," which implies a high
degree of intentionality, to "gross negligence," which merely can be a reckless disregard of
others. See id.
242. Vagueness in the standard for awarding punitive damages is particularly destructive
because these damages, standing somewhere between criminal and tort law, publicly condemn
a defendant's actions as socially reprehensible. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 727-28 (1989) (noting that vague standard is harmful
because damages often lead to public stigma and society should be certain such condemnation
is appropriate).
243. H.R. 956, § 108(a). This also is the standard adopted by the Model Act recently
approved by the uniform law commissioners. See Model Act, supra note 9, § 5(2) (noting that
"defendant acted with a malicious or fraudulent intent to cause the injury or a conscious and
flagrant disregard for the rights or interests of others in causing the injury"). The single federal
standard, however, is preferable to the Model Act standard which seems to articulate a number
of different kinds of conduct that will give rise to punitive damages.
244. But see E. Donald Elliot, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively,
40 AlA. L. REV. 1053, 1057-58 (1989) (arguing that "conscious indifference" standard is too
vague).
245. See Ellis, supra note 27, at 22-23 (arguing that even if standards for assessing punitive
damages were consistent, any movement away from "purposeful harm" standard would be
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criminal component of punitive damages mandates that a defendant
act intentionally before this form of punishment may be imposed
upon him. Otherwise, the justifications for imposing punitive
damages, punishment and deterrence, break down. That a defendant
should not be punished for unintentional conduct seems obvious.
Such a defendant is not deserving of punishment because only
blameworthy conduct should be subject to punishment. In addition,
the effectiveness of deterrence decreases when defendants are
punished for unintentional conduct, because such conduct is more
difficult for individuals to identify and control.246
3. Bifurcation of punitive damage issues
The proposed federal bill, if enacted, would have allowed either
party to bifurcate the trial of punitive damages from the other issues
in the case.247 The primary reason for bifurcation is to prevent jury
bias and prejudice.2' For example, although defendant's wealth
must be considered when determining punitive damages,249 some
concern exists that juries might improperly consider such evidence
when assessing plaintiffs' compensatory damages. To avoid this
impropriety, bifurcation should be permitted." ° It must be ac-
knowledged, however, that bifurcation would lead to more costly and
time consuming trials, which in turn would be detrimental to the
injured victim.
4. Capping punitive damage awards
Recently proposed federal legislation would cap punitive damage
awards in products liability cases at twice the economic 21 and
problematic).
246. See Gregory J. Sexto, Corporate Insurability of Punitive Damages Arising from Employee Acts,
11J. CoRe. L. 99, 113 (1985) (observing that it is more difficult to deter unintentional conduct
than intentional conduct).
247. See H.R. 956, § 108(c) (stating that bifurcation is permissible).
248. SeeJohn T. Simpson, Jr., Discovery of Net Worth in Bifurcated Punitive Damages Cases: A
Suggeted Approach After Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 37 S. TEX. L REV. 193, 228
(1996) (assertingjury prejudice is negated because defendant's net worth is not admissible until
jury finds defendant liable for punitive damages).
249. SeeTXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 880, 889 (W. Va. 1992)
(discussing role wealth should play in computing appropriate punitive award), afid, 509 U.S. 443
(1993).
250. See Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Casefor Reforming PunitiveDamages Procedures,
69 VA. L. REv. 269, 272 (1983) (noting that bifurcation may be necessary to ensure due process
protections). But see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip., 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991) (holding that
common law method of determining punitive damages is not "so inherently unfair as to deny
due process and be per se unconstitutional").
251. See H.R. 956, § 108(8). Economic losses are those actual out-of-pocket expenses
suffered by the injured party such as medical bills and lost wages. See id.
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noneconomic loss,22 or $250,000, whichever is greater.23  Wheth-
er to place an arbitrary cap on the amount of punitive damages that
can be awarded or to limit them to a multiple of the actual damages
suffered is perhaps the most controversial of all tort reform issues.
a. Even if punitive damages cost consumers good products, they
should not be limited
Cap supporters argue that the cap provides necessary relief for
corporations who currently are subject to unbridled jury discretion in
awarding punitive damages.' They also argue that the threat of
excessively large punitive damage awards discourages companies from
marketing new products, thereby depriving the public of beneficial
products and rendering American businesses unable to compete in a
global market 255 The conference report on the recently proposed
federal legislation stated:
American manufacturers must contend with the uncertainty created
by 51 different product liability jurisdictions in their own domestic
market. The result is a de facto "liability tax" which chills interstate
commerce and deprives consumers of product choices available to
252. See id. § 101(12). Noneconomic loss is pain and suffering or non-pecuniary damages.
See id.
253. See id. § 108(b). The bill, however, contains an additur provision that permits ajudge
to raise a punitive damage award if the court determines that the statutory cap "would result in
an award of punitive damages that is insufficient to punish the egregious conduct of the
defendant against whom the punitive damages are to be awarded or to deter such conduct in
the future." Id. § 108(b) (3) (A). Although this provision attempts to placate those who oppose
capping punitive damage awards, its constitutionality is suspect under existing precedent. See
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 495 (1935) (finding that additur could not be utilized by
federal courts because procedure violates Seventh Amendment); see also Irene Deaville Sann,
Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 157, 163-64 (1987) (stating that federal courts may not add to jury awards
because of possible Seventh Amendment violation). But see Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2222 n.16 (1996) (hinting that federal additur soon may be held
constitutional by Supreme Court, because four Justices in Dimick conceded that nothing in
Seventh Amendment precludes federal court from forcing additur (citing Dimick, 293 U.S. at
495)).
There is no logical reason for the different constitutional treatment of additur and remittitur,
and at least two states currently authorize judicial additur of punitive damage awards. See Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 510.263(6) (West Supp. 1997) ("The doctrines of remittitur and additur ... shall
apply to punitive damage awards."); TENN. CODEANN. § 20-10-101(a) (10) (Supp. 1996) ("[T]he
trial judge may suggest an additur in such amount or amounts as the trial judge deems
proper.").
254. See Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An
Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY LJ. 303, 323 (1991) (outlining argument of cap supporters and
stating that corporations could be driven to bankruptcy unless statutory caps are imposed).
255. It is hard to follow the argument that American competitiveness in the global
marketplace is hampered by punitive awards. Foreign manufacturers that do business in the
United States are subject to the same conditions as American manufacturers. Moreover, it seems
that manufacturing better, safer products will improve American competitiveness far more than
limiting punitive damage awards will.
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consumers in other nations throughout the world. Unfortunately,
instead of encouraging the development of safer products, the
present system often forces manufacturers to increase product
prices or withdraw products from the market altogether."
Cap supporters argue that because of fear of unquantifiable liability
exposure, the cautious manufacturers would be over-deterred and
unwilling to invest in research and development for potentially
valuable products. z 7 The threat of large punitive damage awards
can discourage the use of safe products, taking choices and valuable
products away from consumers. For example, decades after the
Dalkon Shield disaster, many doctors still refuse to prescribe new,
safe, reliable IUDs for women,' despite the fact that experts find
the IUD to be a low risk, dependable form of birth control." 9
Doctors are not alone. Apparently, even manufacturers are not
interested in marketing the product in the United States because of
the threat of excessive punitive awards.
°
Cap supporters also argue that limiting punitive damages would be
beneficial because it would put the defendant on notice regarding his
potential liability for inappropriate conduct. The Supreme Court in
BMW noted the importance of "fair notice" as to both the type of
conduct that will give rise to punitive awards and the severity of the
potential punishment that will be imposed. 61
Capping punitive damages, however, is a double-edged sword, the
costs of which far outweigh the benefits. Even if all of the arguments
put forth by supporters of a cap are true,262 those arguments still are
256. ConferenceReport on H.R. 956, Common Sense Product Liability Reform of 1996, 142 CONG.
REC. H3190 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
257. See Ausness, supra note 30, at 85-86 (stating that potential exposure to liability leads to
significant social costs); Ellis, supra note 27, at 47 (noting that uncertainty as to amount of
punitive damages causes considerable losses to society).
258. See Patricia Cohen, The IUD: Birth-Control Device that the United States Market Won't Bear,
WAsH. PosT, Aug. 6, 1996, at Al, A10 (observing that doctors in United States are reluctant to
prescribe IUD devices even though they are freely prescribed and widely used in European
markets).
259. See id. (pointing out that some experts on women's health belive that IUD is excellent
option for many women).
260. See id. (stating that many manufacturers believe that introducing device to U.S. market
is not worth potential exposure to liability).
261. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-99 (1996) (discussing how
common notions of fairness mandate that people receive fair notice of punishment they may
face).
262. See Rustad, supra note 50, at 83 (proposing that punitive damages do not harm
American corporations any more than foreign corporations because both are subject to U.S.
law); Product Liability Standards: Hearings on H.&. 1910 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 329, 332
(1994) (statement of Andrew F. Popper, Professor of Lawand Deputy Dean, Washington College
of Law) (arguing that there is no tort crisis sufficient to justify congressional intervention).
There does not seem to be sufficient objective evidence to conclude that American businesses
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insufficient to justify a superficial, arbitrary limit on punitive awards.
Punitive damage awards operate to deter the conduct society wishes
to abolish.21 A punitive award, therefore, must be high enough to
achieve this goal. Limiting punitive damage awards would undermine
the deterrent value of the threat of such awards.
The essential purpose of punitive damages would be thwarted if we
required that they conform to any mathematical equation. In
Rideout's-Brown Service, Inc. v. Holloway, [the district court] said that
for punitive damages to be effective the amount of damages "ought
to be large enough to hurt. It ought to sting in order to deter, that
is its purpose.
' 21
Although the threat of punitive awards may discourage manufacturers
from developing some products, more importantly, it keeps many
dangerous products off the market. Economic efficiency, not
economic perfection, is all that is required by our tort system.2
Tort law's goal of promoting efficient resource allocation also
supports not capping punitive damage awards.2' Because a business
is an economically-rational, profit-seeking entity, it will evaluate the
costs and benefits of undertaking any activity, manufacturing decision,
or design choice.26 7  If a company believes that the benefits of a
particular action outweigh the costs, it will undertake that action.2"
are harmed as badly as cap supporters claim or that consumers are deprived of a large number
of products by over-deterrence. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, a great deal of
empirical evidence is needed to support these claims. Without sufficient objective evidence, it
is impossible to draw a conclusion either way. This Article, therefore, presumes that consumers
lose out on some products when American businesses are hampered by large punitive damage
awards.
263. SeeWilson, supra note 25, at 513-14 (indicating that punitive damages assist in deterring
misconduct).
264. SeeAssociates Fin. Servs. Co. ofAla. v. Barbour, 592 So. 2d 191,199 (Ala. 1991) (reciting
reasoning of earlier case in which court found that only substantial monetary fines will ensure
that purpose of punitive damages is carried out (quoting Rideout's-Brown Serv., Inc. v. Holloway,
397 So. 2d 125, 127 (Ala. 1981))) (citation omitted).
265. Although it may be true that the punitive damage system occasionally deprives the
public of valuable products, it also protects the public from exposure to dangerous products.
No remedy is perfect.
266. SeeWILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRE OF TORT LAW
4-5 (1987) (discussing early thinking on tort law and positive economic theory). Judge Learned
Hand articulated his famous negligence formula, B < PL, in United States v. Carrol Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947). According tojudge Hand, harmful activity should be deterred
when the cost of that harm (L) multiplied by its probability (P) is greater than the cost of
preventing the harm (B). Thus, if B < P there is no harmful activity. See id.; see also RICH-ARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163-68 (1992) (explainingJudge Hand's formula for
determining negligence liability).
267. SeeJerryJ. Phillips, A Comment on Proposal forDet erining Amounts ofPunitiveAward 40
AlA. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1989) (noting that cost-benefit analysis often is utilized when
considering which activities and designs to avoid).
268. See id. (stating that company will take action only if cost of such action is less than its
potential benefits).
1624 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1573
Tort law's deterrent effect is based on utilitarian values; more
specifically, punitive damages liability deters socially unacceptable
behavior by increasing the cost of such behavior so that it no longer
is economically rational to act in that manner.69 Punitive damages
awarded in tort cases have the effect of regulating social conduct by
punishing and deterring conduct that society deems unacceptable.
In order to achieve these goals, the threat of punitive damages must
be greater than the benefit achieved by the misconduct. Because
corporations are the only parties with perfect information on this
equation, deterrence will be effective only if the threat of large
punitive damages continues to loom over those willing to place
corporate profit ahead of human safety.270
If punitive damages are capped, they would cease to be an effective
deterrent Capped damages would enable defendants to calculate
their maximum exposure and thereby permit an economic analysis
similar to the one conducted by Ford in the Pinto case. 2 1  In the
269. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 266, at 4-5 (discussing view that tort liability
discourages behavior that is unjustified by utilitarian standards).
270. Commentators have argued that punitive damages are inappropriate when the
manufacturer weighed the costs and benefits of a particular activity and undertook the activity
because the cost was less than the benefit. See Wheeler, supra note 62, at 953 (arguing that
juries should be instructed to consider cost-benefit analysis in assessing liability). Such an
argument presupposes that socially desirable conduct turns on a pure economic analysis of
available options. This premise overlooks the fact that punitive damages are awarded to punish
a manufacturer for socially reprehensible conduct. They are a form of regulation. Punitive
damages are not awarded simply for economic inefficiency, because a corporation took an action
even though costs exceed benefits; they are also awarded when potential societal costs exceed
potential societal benefits. Societal costs and benefits cannot be measured purely in monetary
terms. For example, under an economic efficiency analysis of the costs and benefits of
excluding the rubber bladder from vehicle design, Ford properly concluded that it would be
more economically efficient to exclude the bladder. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 361 (1981). Despite the correctness of the economic analysis, few dispute the
appropriateness of imposing damages for such conduct.
271. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (discussing design changes that were examined by
Ford but rejected due to their additional expense). The plaintiffs were passengers in a Ford
Pinto when it was rear-ended and burst into flames. See id at 359. Plaintiff Gray died and
Plaintiff Grimshaw suffered severe burns to his entire body. See id. The court found that Ford
knew of the design defect in the Pinto and knew that the gas tank would explode in rear-end
collisions even at low speeds. See id at 361-62. Ford had conducted several crash tests that
demonstrated the Pinto's susceptibility to fire. See ia. at 385. Despite this knowledge, Ford
chose not to correct the design problem after conducting a risk/benefit analysis. See id. at 361.
Ford discovered that it would cost $11 per vehicle to install rubber bladders in 11 million Pintos
and 1.5 million trucks, totaling $137 million; and it estimated that it would cost only $49.5
million if instead they paid the compensatory damages of the 360 people they anticipated would
die or be injured in fires resulting from this design flaw. See Owen, supra note 28, at 56 n.264
(reproducing Grush-Saunby Report that Ford had prepared on costs and benefits of correcting
Pinto's defective gas tank). Ford performed a straight forward cost-benefit analysis and chose
the least expensive alternative. See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361. Grimshaw vras awarded
$2,516,000 in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages, which the trial
court reduced to $3.5 million. See id. at 358.
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end, capped damages effectively would lower safety standards. As
Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) noted:
The cap of $250,000 on punitive damages is tragic. No Fortune
500 company, or some not even Fortune 500, will be deterred from
placing dangerous products on the market because of a quarter of
a million dollar threat of punitive damages. It will be factored into
the pricing.
272
For example, suppose Compact Cars wants to manufacture a new
1997 model Pinto. Compact's design engineers approach manage-
ment with a design choice: should they include rubber bladders
around the gas tank to reduce explosions when there are rear-end
collisions, or should they forgo the bladder in order to reduce costs?
Compact's preliminary tests show that upon rear impact at thirty miles
per hour, the gas tank has a four percent chance of exploding.
Management retains an economist to conduct a cost/benefit analysis
on the rubber bladder. The economist finds that it will cost Compact
$50 per car to include the rubber bladder. Compact plans to sell five
million Pintos. So, the cost of including the bladder is $250 million.
The Compact economist then turns to the cost savings, or benefit,
of excluding the bladder. He estimates that Compact will be sued for
100 burn deaths and 200 serious bum injuries as a result of gas tank
explosions.2 73  He estimates the compensatory damages for each
human life at $250,000 and each human injury at $100,000. The
damages Compact will sustain, therefore, are $45 million.
If the new federal tort reform bill274 including a cap on punitive
damages had passed, the economist would calculate the cost associat-
ed with the punitive damages. 275  If every death resulted in the
maximum punitive damage award under the new statute, Compact
would owe $50 million276 and if every injured plaintiff also received
the maximum punitive damage award, Compact would owe an
272. CanferenceReport on H.R. 956, Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of1996,142 CONG.
REC. H3188 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers, Jr.).
273. Of course, the actual number of injuries will be much higher than those who actually
sue Compact. Many injured individuals will not sue at all; some will collect from their insurance
company or from the insurance company of the driver who rear-ended them. Only those
plaintiffs or their attorneys who realize that there may have been a design defect in the car will
bring suit against Compact.
274. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996).
275. Although it is true that the federal bill did allow for additur in certain circumstances
and, therefore, did not have an absolute cap, Congress' dearly expressed intent is that judges
should do so only in the rarest of cases. See H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-481, at 31 (1996).
276. The statute provided for $250,000 or two times compensatory damages, whichever is
greater. See H.R. 956, § 108(b). In the case of the 100 burn deaths, where compensatory
damages are estimated at $250,000, punitive damages would be two times the compensatory
damages or $50 million.
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additional $50 million.277 Thus, Compact's total potential punitive
damages liability would be $100 million.
The economist would determine that while the cost of including
the bladder would be $250 million, it would cost Compact only an
estimated $145 million in damages if they chose to exclude the
bladder. Compact's management, being economically rational
business people, would decide that the costs of excluding the bladder
exceed its benefits, and would direct the engineers not to include the
bladder in the new Pinto.
This example, while admittedly rudimentary in its economic
analysis, demonstrates how companies could factor punitive damages
into the cost-benefit analysis of any given design choice. If corpora-
tions can do this, they will continue to put corporate profit ahead of
human safety and the goals of our punitive damage system will be
eviscerated.
Unless punitive damages are greater than the full economic profit
of the misconduct, corporations will not be deterred; no economic
incentive to avoid socially reprehensible conduct will be created.
278
If the total potential cost in damages is less than the benefit of profit
or expenditures saved, then manufacturers will continue to engage in
unsafe practices.279 Further, because corporations control all of the
information regarding design choices and manufacturing decisions,
it is virtually impossible to determine properly the amount of
economic benefit the defendant might reap from the corporation's
misconduct.
280
Moreover, simply capturing the defendant's profits, the exact
amount defendant benefitted, is not enough to function as a
deterrent even if it were possible to determine accurately the
amount. Because not all defendants are caught and brought to
justice, many defendants would undertake the misconduct with the
hope that they would not get caught. If corporations stand to lose
277. In the case of the 200 injured plaintiffs, $250,000 is more than two times their
compensatory damages, which are only $100,000 in this example. Thus, each injured plaintiff
would receive $250,000 for a total of $50 million.
278. Of course, there is the loss of public confidence in the corporation and litigation
expenses that add to the "expense" of committing socially reprehensible actions. In fact, one
commentator has recommended that punitive damage awards and the reasons for the
punishment be highly publicized to effectuate a more powerful social sanction. SeeAndrea A.
Curcio, Painful Publiy-An Alternate Punitive Damages Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L REV. 341, 372
(1996) (arguing that publicizing corporate misconduct and resulting penalties on the Internet
will best effectuate intended punishment and deterrence).
279. See generally Rustad & Koening, supra note 18, at 1316 (discussing Gearhart v. Uniden
Corp. of Am., 781 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1986), in which defendant accepted liability for known
defendant as "a mere cost of doing business").
280. See id. at 1312.
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exactly the amount that they would gain from the conduct, and there
is a chance that they will not get caught, corporations will favor
misconduct. To deter effectively, the potential loss must exceed the
potential gain. The rationales that justify punitive damage awards,
punishment and deterrence, are effective precisely because of the
unpredictability of the size of such awards. Therefore, one of the
biggest complaints of tort reform advocates, that the size of punitive
damage awards is unpredictable, 211 is precisely what makes them an
effective deterrent
Capping punitive awards at a multiple of compensatory damages
would eviscerate the punitive and deterrence goals underlying
punitive damage awards. Professors Michael Rustad and Thomas
Koenig argue that
Lopsided ratios between punitive and compensatory damages
awards are often necessary for the punishment and deterrence of
powerful corporations. The remedy's effectiveness in doing so
stems from its unpredictability. Capping punitive damages would
undermine the deterrent effect of the remedy by making it possible
for corporations to calculate their maximum exposure and
therefore make a profit-based determination as to whether "really
mean behavior" is good business practice.
2 2
Another problem inherent in making punitive damages a multiple
of compensatory damages arises when the manufacturer could have
caused an enormous amount of harm but fortuitously escaped with
minimal actual damage. In cases where the actual damages are low,
the jury will be unable to take into account the nature of the
misconduct or the potential harm that could have resulted from the
defendant's actions.2s Punitive damages should be based, at least
in part, on the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct, not solely
on the severity of the actual harm caused.
Limiting potential punitive damage liability would put ethical
corporations, ones which spend funds testing a product's safety prior
to marketing, at a competitive disadvantage. Ethical corporations
would be forced to charge a higher price for their products because
of the added expenses of testing.
281. See Elliott, supra note 244, at 1057 (claiming that unpredictability is the "central failing"
of punitive damages).
282. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 1277.
283. Presumably, the additur provisions of the federal bill would have permitted higher
awards in such cases at thejudge's discretion. SeeH.1. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(b) (3) (A) (1996).
Congress' intention, however, was that "occasions for additional awards will be very limited
indeed." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-481, at 31 (1996).
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Punitive damages are consistent with the self-interest of the business
community in terms of long-run competitiveness. The remedy
keeps the ethical corporation from being at a competitive disadvan-
tage. Restricting this remedy tempts corporations to put profits
before public safety. In the long run, the American emphasis on
safety, backed by punitive damages against those corporations which
violate this important American value, will produce the top quality
products needed to compete in the international marketplace.s
Therefore, even if punitive damage awards do hamper the develop-
ment of some new products and do threaten American competitive-
ness, they should not be capped. Capping punitive damages would
weaken their value as a deterrent by permitting manufacturers to
calculate the potential loss associated with manufacturing dangerous
products, and then determine whether such socially reprehensible
conduct is good business. Moreover, the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct and the potential harm it could have caused no
longer would factor into the punishment. And finally, corporations
that do test their products and make design choices that weigh
human impact more heavily than corporate profit would be at a
competitive disadvantage. Capping punitive damages would encour-
age the misconduct society seeks to prevent, resulting in a cure that
would be worse than the disease.
b. Even if punitive damages cost consumers money in the form of
higher prices, they should not be limited
Proponents of limiting a defendant's liability for intentional
misconduct also argue that large punitive damage awards actually
harm consumers, employees, and shareholders of the corporation,
because the corporation ultimately must pass these expenses on to
them.s When a corporation is forced to pay punitive damages, it
raises corporate operating expenses.2 8 Corporations, then, cover
these increased costs by raising prices and forcing the consumer to
bear the burden assessed for corporate misconduct.287  Such price
284. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damages in Products Liability: A Research
Report, 3 PROD. LIAB. LJ. 85, 94 (1992).
285. See Product Liability Fairness Hearing, supra note 24, at 89 (testimony of William Fry,
Executive Director, HALT, an organization of Americans for Legal Reform) (noting that
punitive damages, or fear of them, are passed on "to consumers in the form of higher prices or
products not getting to the market").
286. See 141 CONG. REC. S5884 (daily ed. May 1,1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (discussing
need for U.S. manufacturers to add costs of punitive damages into price of products thus
affecting U.S. consumers and competitiveness of U.S. corporations in global marketplace).
287. Proponents for national tort reform contend that punitive damage awards need
regulation because consumers, especially the low income purchasers, ultimately bear the costs
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raising often is referred to as a "tort tax" or a "hidden tax."288 Thus,
instead of defendants bearing tort award costs directly, consumers
actually would subsidize tort damages awarded to victims.
29
In a competitive market, however, it is unlikely that a manufacturer
could pass all of these costs on to its consumers and still maintain its
competitive market position.290 In a purely captive consumer
situation, corporations would be able to pass off any expense incurred
by raising prices.2 ' In a competitive market, however, a corporation
could not raise its prices too high or consumers would switch to a
competitor's product. 29 2 Even when there is no competitive market
and the corporation has a monopoly over a product or service,293 at
some point the utility derived from the product or service would be
outweighed by the cost. Simply put, if a corporation raises the price
too high, the consumer will stop buying the product. Corporations,
therefore, will try to avoid incurring punitive damage judgments
because they often cannot pass off all the costs on consumers. In this
way, punitive damage payments allow society to regulate corporate
conduct.
The "pass-through" economic argument-that consumers, not the
corporation, bear the extra burden associated with punitive damages
in the form of higher prices--does not support capping punitive
of punitive damage payments. See id at S5882 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The effect of the
greater frequency and magnitude of punitive damages recoveries of modern times has been to
increase the price level for all products and services provided in the U.S. economy."); see also id.
at S5801 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Snowe) (claiming that consumers must pay
higher prices due to runaway awards). One problem with this theory, however, is that it assumes
that the consumer is a captive and would continue to buy the corporation's product or service
regardless of the increases in price. One cannot ignore the argument that in a competitive
market, a corporation would not be able to raise its prices too high or consumers simply would
switch to a competitor's product. See generally GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY oF PRicE 21-44
(1966) (delineating factors affecting consumer demand including price fluctuations).
288. See 141 CONG REc. S5950 (daily ed. May 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (musing that
"[tihese outrageous punitive damages create a tort tax paid by consumers in the form of higher
prices, higher insurance premiums, and reduced market choice and quality"); Richard J.
Mahoney, Punishment WithoutEnd, WASH. POST,June 15, 1995, atA21 ("The real damage caused
by multiple punitive damage awards is that the American public has been hit with a 'hidden
litigation tax.'").
289. Furthermore, if corporations are permitted to insure against punitive damage awards
as some states allow, a manufacturer with insurance would pass the costs of premiums on to
consumers and the insurance company would spread the loss associated with the punitive
damage payment among its customers in the form of higher premiums.
290. See generally STIGLEX, supra note 287, at 87 (describing type of competitive market in
which sellers outnumber buyers).
291. See generaffy id. (describing type of competitive market in which buyers outnumber
sellers).
292. See generally id at 21-44 (discussing factors affecting consumer demand including
responses to price increases).
293. Such a situation could arise if a corporation had a patent on one of its product and
chose not to license it to others.
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damage awards. If a choice must be made between the public in
general and the specific consumers of a product made by a manufac-
turer who exhibits a flagrant indifference to human safety, the burden
should fall upon the latter.294 The consumer has a choice, unlike
the unsuspecting victim, or society in general. The consumer can
avoid sharing in the cost of the corporation's misconduct simply by
refusing to buy the corporation's product. Those who would have
benefitted from the corporate wrongdoing, including consumers,
shareholders, and employees, should bear the burden of the costs
associated with that conduct.295
c. Limiting punitive damages to a multiple of economic and
noneconomic loss discriminates against women and minorities
In addition, the proposed cap on punitive damages discriminates
against woman and minorities. Because human life usually is valued
in terms of economic loss, which often translates into earning
potential,29 disparate awards are granted to victims of different
genders, even though they suffer the same injuries.2" For example,
two individuals, a man and a woman, suffer exactly the same injury
rendering both unable to work. The man is an engineer. His
economic damages would include his lost wages, say $200,000, and his
potential punitive damage award would be a multiple of these same
294. This is true, even if, as proponents of tort reform argue, punitive damage payments are
skyrocketing in magnitude. It should not be forgotten that punitive damage awards undergo
judicial review to determine their reasonableness. See supra notes 45, 55 and accompanying text
(discussing settlement agreements and reductions in awards by appeals courts).
295. As one commentator noted-
Loss spreading is a separate justification for imposing a full measure of damages on
business firms that cause the harm. Firms can spread the losses broadly among
individuals who benefit from the harm-causing activity. Depending on the economics
of the situation, losses are spread either among consumers through increased prices
or among owners by virtue of lower profits. Either way, someone who derives a
substantial direct benefit from the injury-producing product or activity bears the cost.
Charles R. Temper, Compensation for Harm fom CharitableActivity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401,430-31
(1991) (foomote omitted).
296. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1, 78-79 (1995) (explaining that women generally receive smaller
economic awards for similar injuries because women generally have lower earnings and spend
fewer years in workforce).
297. See Punitive Damages Hearing, supra note 24, at 80 (statement of Robert Creamer,
Executive Director, Illinois Public Action).
[T] his proposal would have the result of basing punishment meted out to a wrongdoer
on the income of the victim. It would punish those who injure wealthy executives
more than those who injure women who are homemakers. It would punish those who
injure sports stars more than those who injure children. The proposal is particularly
discriminatory againstwomen, who generallysuffer less economic loss from injury than
men since they typically earn less income.
Id. (statement of Robert Creamer, Executive Director, Illinois Public Action).
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lost wages. Under the proposed federal bill, his punitive damages
award would be two times $200,000, or $400,000. The woman is a
homemaker and has suffered little economic loss, so the compensa-
tion she receives for the same injury would be substantially less as
would any possible punitive award she may receive, capped at
$250,000. As this example demonstrates, capping punitive damages
in product liability cases will have a disproportionately negative impact
on women.
2 98
The same rationale applies to minorities. "Women and minorities'
wages are between three-quarter and one-half of the salaries of
average white men... [with] white women earn[ing] only 69 cents,
African-American women earned only 62 cents, and Hispanic women
earned only 54 cents for every dollar earned by white men."299 Like
women, minorities generally occupy lower-paying jobs and therefore
have less economic loss.3°°
This disparity results in unequal punishment of similarly situated
wrongdoers. Corporations who manufacture products marketed
exclusively or predominantly toward women and minorities would not
be punished as severely as corporations who manufacture products
marketed toward men, where there is generally higher economic loss
and therefore the potential for higher punitive damages. Not only
would women and minorities not receive as large a punitive damage
award when they are injured, but they would have to contend with
more unsafe products. This system of economic valuation is the
functional equivalent of a directive that companies will not be
punished as severely if they hurt a woman or minority as they will be
if they hurt a Caucasian man. Therefore, manufacturers of products
targeting women and minorities would take fewer safety precautions
and would engage in more risky behavior because they have less to
lose. This directive is magnified by the fact that women and
minorities have less access to the legal system and are less likely to
298. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 296, at 87.
When damages awards are based primarily on out-of-pocket costs and loss of earnings,
women are placed at a significant disadvantage. Without the prospect of non-economic
and punitive damages, many grievously injured women will be unable to convince an
attorney to take their case. The proposed limitations on punitive damages are gender
injustice in disguise.
Id
299. 138 CONG. REc. S6521 (daily ed. May 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
300. See Kathleen Morris, Through the Looking Glass: Recent Developnents in Affirmative Action,
11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 182, 188 (1996) (charging that "minorities and women tend to be
'ghettoized' into lower-paying, lower-skilled jobs").
1997] 1631
THE AMEmCAN UNWERSrIY LAW REVEW [Vol. 46:1573
bring suit."' Moreover, in light of the lower compensatory damages
and accordingly lower punitive damages, women and minorities would
be less likely to find counsel willing to take their case. Therefore,
capping punitive damages as some multiple of economic loss has a
discriminatory impact on women and minorities.
d. The Model Act proposes a better solution
The unbridled discretion ofjuries to award any punishment amount
they see fit without any guidance is an unnecessary evil. For the
reasons discussed above, however, capping punitive damages also is
too extreme."0 2 The Model Act proposes a better alternative.
Instead of imposing an arbitrary cap on punitive awards, the Model
Act requires the jury to consider several factors to determine what
constitutes a "fair and reasonable amount of punitive damages,"
including:
(1) the nature of defendant's wrongful conduct and its effect on
the claimant and others;
(2) the amount of compensatory damages;
(3) any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant through the
wrongful conduct, in excess of that likely to be divested by this or
other actions against the defendant for compensatory damages or
restitution;
(4) the defendant's present and future financial condition and the
effect of an award on each condition;
(5) any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid or to be paid
by the defendant arising from the wrongful conduct;
(6) any adverse effect of the award on innocent persons;
(7) any remedial measures taken or not taken by the defendant
since the wrongful conduct;
(8) compliance or noncompliance with any applicable standard
promulgated by a governmental or other generally recognized
agency or organization whose function it is to establish standards;
and
(9) any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the
amount of the award."3
The factors offered in the Model Act track those endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Haslip, TXO, and BMW." °4 Requiring the jury to
301. See Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Ac and the Construction of Multiple
Conscou s in the Civil Rghts and Feminist Movements, 4J.L. & POL 'Y 463, 498 (1996) (finding
access to the legal system a significant obstacle for minority women).
302. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
303. Model Act, supra note 9, § 7.
304. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-1602 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 468 n.28 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
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consider certain well-defined factors in determining the amount of
punitive damages awarded would result in easier and more limited
review by both the district and appellate courts. Such guidance
regarding the criteria for assessing the amount of awards would add
greater certainty to the award process and would reduce the instances
of excessive awards, without sacrificing the goals behind the imposi-
tion of such awards: punishment and deterrence. In those instances
when excessive awards are proffered, judicial remittitur or reversal
would be made easier by consideration of the mandated factors.
If the burden of proof is raised and the liability standard is changed
to require a degree of intent, as proposed in this Article, then
punitive damage awards would be available only when the plaintiff
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with
conscious indifference towards the plaintiffs safety. Why should the
potential liability of an individual who acts intentionally to harm
society be limited? Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) once said:
"Punitive damages reform is not about shielding wrongdoers from
liability, ... Safeguards are needed to protect against abuse in the
award of punitive damages.""0 5 If punitive damages were capped for
those corporations who are proven, by dear and convincing evidence,
to have acted intentionally to harm society with no regard for
anything but corporate profits, wrongdoers would be shielded from
liability. Raising the evidentiary burden and liability standards are the
only necessary safeguards. Moreover, judicial review and the tool of
remittitur still will be available.
The better route is the one proposed in the Model Act, where the
legislature dictates the factors that ajury must consider when assessing
a punitive damage award and requires detailed findings justifying the
award. The Model Act, unlike the vetoed federal bill, also addresses
the problem posed by multiple punitive damages awards that are
unfairly duplicative."0 6
It provides: "If the court determines that an award of punitive
damages in the pending case is unfairly duplicative, it shall reduce the
award accordingly.""0 7 It requires that courts consider the following:
[T] he bases of liability for the punitive damages awarded, the
purposes for which the awards were made, how the awards were
determined or calculated, whether the defendant has already
499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991).
305. Punitive Damages Heawing, supra note 24, at I (statement of Sen. Hatch).
306. See Model Act, supra note 9, § 10(a).
307. Model Act, supra note 9, § 10(a). The Model Act also requires that the reviewing court
make and enter its findings and the basis for its decision. See id. § 10(c).
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disgorged any unwarranted economic gain for which it was held
liable under Section 6(b), and any other evidence offered by the
parties relevant to the issue of whether the petitioner is being
subjected to unfair duplicative awards of punitive damages.=
Federal legislation should incorporate this concept from the Model
Act rather than a "first comer" rule, and should regulate the
imposition of multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct.
Proponents of national tort reform designed to curb the imposition
of multiple damage awards have advocated a "first comer" rule
accompanied by a limited number of exceptions."° For example,
if the plaintiff in a later suit is able to offer new evidence not present
at the first trial, or if the judge determines that the amount of
punitive damages awarded in the first case was insufficient to punish
or deter the defendant, a second award may be justified. Federal
legislation either should incorporate the consideration of past
punitive damage awards into the assessment process or should allow
the defendant, on post-verdict motion, to bring to the court's
attention other punitive awards paid, so that the court can reduce the
jury verdict accordingly. '
If corporate manufacturers still need saving from profit-threatening
punitive damage awards, the legislature could then revisit the cap
issue. At present, why destroy the goals of punitive awards,
rendering them ineffective for their anticipated purpose, by capping
them?
312
308. 1& § 10.
309. See PunitiveDamages Heafing, supranote 24, at 105 (testimony ofVictor E. Schwartz, Esq.,
General Counsel, American Tort Reform Association) (calling on Congress to remedy unfairness
caused by imposition of multiple punitive damage awards).
310. See id. § 10.
311. On a purely practical note, Congress would be more likely to pass tort reform legislation
if the controversial cap were omitted. As Congress has tried to pass such reform every year since
1982, it would seem preferable to pass some reform-like the elevated burden of proof and
uniform standard requiring intentional conduct-rather than no reform. Given President
Clinton's re-election, perhaps it is time that Congress consider a more limited reform for the
time being.
312. The effectiveness ofpunitive damage awards already are undermined by permitting their
insurability and the tax deductibility. See Pace, supra note 6, at 828 (insisting that tax
deductibility of punitive damages frustrates deterrence and punishment goals of product liability
laws). Permitting corporations to insure against their own intentional misconduct or to deduct
the payment of these fines from their taxes costs the public twice, first when it is subjected to
unsafe products and second when it must bear the burden of the corporation's intentional
misconduct through higher taxes and insurance premiums. See id. Ideally, federal reform would
address both of these concerns by prohibiting their insurability and removing the tax incentive,
that is, deductibility, for the misconduct. See id.
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5. Regulatory compliance as a bar to punitive damages
A regulatory compliance defense has appeared in many of the
recent congressional bills on tort reform as well as in a number of
state tort reform measures. 13 This defense provides that compli-
ance with existing regulations either presumptively or conclusively,
depending upon the legislation, immunizes the defendant from the
imposition of punitive damages. In effect, this means that the federal
regulatory standards become the tort standards as well. The
arguments in favor of such a defense are agency expertise, predictabil-
ity, and reduction in the scope of liability. The agencies that
promulgate regulations are experts in their field and they know,
better than judges or juries, what standards of safety are reasonable
in a particular industry. 14 The agency has obtained the necessary
data to make risk comparisons and to set properly a safe standard that
protects the public."-' The judiciary, therefore, should defer to
agency expertise.1 6 A regulatory compliance defense would man-
date such deference.
Moreover, such a defense would help to control what many
characterize as escalating and unjustified punitive damage awards by
reducing the scope of liability and by giving defendants more notice
as to the prohibited conduct Finally, penalizing defendants by
awarding punitive damages when the defendant has complied with
existing federal regulations can be viewed as fundamentally unfair and
inefficient.
There are problems, however, which plague the regulatory
compliance defense. One significant problem is that agency
regulations often are vague, inadequate, outdated, and obsolete.
317
313. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (listing state statutes that include regulatory
compliance defense). The most recent federal tort reform attempt, H.R. 956, originally
contained a regulatory compliance defense for companies that act in compliance with FDA
regulations. SeeH.R. 956,104th Cong. § 7 (1996); see alsoVictor E. Schwartz& MarkA. Behrens,
Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1365, 1383 (1993) (arguing in favor of
regulatory compliance defense against punitive damages).
314. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 277, 333-35 (1985) (asserting that courts should defer to expert
opinions of agencies); see alsoJames A. Henderson,Jr.,JudicialReiew of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLtM. L. REV. 1531, 1555-56 (1973) (challenging
suitability of courts to implement tort reform).
315. See Huber, supra note 314, at 335 (indicating that licensing agencies such as Nuclear
Regulatory Commision compare public risks among industry competitors).
316. See id. (expressing view that courts are not qualified to second-guess agencies).
317. See Don Phillips, As Upstart Valujet Grew, So Did FAA's Anxieties, WASH. POST, June 10,
1996, at Al, A12 ("I've been concerned for some time that the airline picture is changing faster
that our methods of checking up on the changing picture." (quotingJohn L. McLucas, a former
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Regulations generally set minimal, not optimal safety standards, which
is a concern voiced by many courts and noted in the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Third) of Torts which rejects a regulatory
compliance defense."' i Pursuant to the Restatement, non-compliance
with federal regulations renders a product defective."1 9 Compliance,
on the other hand, is mere evidence of non-defectiveness and does
not preclude a finding that the product is defective.32
Agencies lack the resources and the ability to keep pace with
technological advancement. Moreover, delays inherent in the
regulatory process make it impossible to keep regulations up-to-date,
especially in this high-tech era when science is changing so quick-
ly. 2' In addition, government prosecution for violations of agency
regulations occur infrequently.322 The government simply does not
have the resources to police corporate misconduct.
FAA administrator)).
318. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 7 & cmt. e (adopting common law
approach that regulatory standards set minimal not optimal standards and therefore, rejecting
per se regulatory compliance defense); see also Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d
Cir. 1987) (concluding that compliance with federal consumer notification regulations precludes
application of strict liability but may be used to establish negligence); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 769 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding on remand punitive damages award
despite defendant's compliance with federal nuclear safety regulations); Toner v. Lederle Labs.,
732 P.2d 297, 311 n.12 (Idaho 1987) (arguing that FDA certification should constitute non-
negligence per se); Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 576, 590-91 (N.M. 1995) (stating that
compliance with regulations will not preclude award of punitive damages); Mulhern v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 432 N.W.2d 130, 135 (WIS. Ct. App. 1988) ("[C]ompliance with the federal
regulation would not have preempted the state strict liability action because the Act and the
regulation are only minimum safety standards which do not provide private tort remedies.").
But see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (giving judicial deference to
regulatory compliance); Stone Man, Inc. v. Green, 435 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. 1993) (stating that
punitive damages generally are not available when defendant has complied with applicable
regulations governing conduct at issue); McDaniel v. McNeil Lab. Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822, 828
(Neb. 1976) (refusing to submit to strict liability theory in case where defendant adhered to FDA
regulations).
319. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 7, § 7(a).
320. See id. § 7(b).
321. See Schwartz, Products Liability, supra note 163, at 1152 (finding that in cases where
punitive damage are awarded regulatory agencies generally have failed to protect public
adequately); see also Rustad, supra note 50, at 73 ("The government is a slow starter and a slow
finisher in uncovering corporate misconduct in product liability cases.").
322. See Rustad, supra note 50, at 73-75 (speculating that government reluctance to
investigate and prosecute product liability cases is due to expense and expertise required).
Professor Rustad found 355 punitive damage awards in products liability actions from 1965 to
1990. See id. at 30; see also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 284, at 89 (stating that punitive damage
awards are rare, although actual number of awards is unknown because no national reporting
system exists). Examining each of these cases, Professor Rustad found that government
regulators were ineffective at uncovering corporate misconduct.
Despite these serious threats to the public safety, corporate defendants rarely received
official sanctions. Only one defendant [of 355] in our sample was criminally
sanctioned for its failure to protect the consuming public. A total of only eleven
defendants received some form of civil penalty from a local, state, or federal agency.
Rustad, supra note 50, at 73.
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In addition to inadequate and antiquated regulations, there is also
the threat of agency capture." "'Agency capture' refers to domina-
tion of an agency by the entities that the agency was created to
control."324 Because agencies depend upon industry for data and
expertise when they promulgate regulations, agency choices predict-
ably reflect industry perspectives." Moreover, because many
agency staff members have worked in the regulated industry, they
share the industry's perspective or expect to work for some regulated
entity in the future, and thus hesitate to criticize industry propos-
als. 2' Moreover, industry has vast resources to devote to agency
lobbying, compared to public interest groups. Corporations have all
the information and the resources.
For these reasons, although evidence of regulatory compliance
might be relevant in a determination of whether to award punitive
damages, it should not be conclusively or presumptively determina-
tive. 27 Although regulatory compliance should not be a defense to
claims of misconduct, federal legislation could include regulatory
compliance among the factors to be considered in assessing punitive
damages, as the Model Act proposes. 28
CONCLUSION
Punitive damage awards can be an effective legal tool for control-
ling corporate misconduct. However, the increase in the magnitude
and frequency of such awards warrants closer scrutiny of the doctrine
and the introduction of safeguards to protect American industry from
abusive penalties. When punitive damage sanctions are awarded in
excessive amounts or are imposed erratically against undeserving
defendants, the tort system as a whole is undermined. Federal tort
323. See Schwartz, Products Liability, supra note 163, at 1147 (discussing extent of influence
enjoyed by business on agencies because agencies rely on industry-generated data in developing
regulations).
324. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure andJudicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L REv. 612, 677 n.308 (1996); see also RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., The Role of
the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory 'of Governmen, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1280-81
(1989) (describing how members of industry and agency policy-makers control decision-making
process); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HAMt. L.
REv. 1511, 1565-66 (1992) (suggesting that top level of agency policy-makers, because they are
fewer in number, are easier to influence than the hundreds of legislators needed to pass new
laws).
325. See Schwartz, Products Liability, supra note 163, at 1147.
326. See Seidenfeld, supra note 324, at 1565.
327. See Schwartz, Punitive Damages, supra note 163, at 1363 (arguing against regulatory
compliance defenses); see also Schwartz, Products Liability, supra note 163, at 1147 (voicing
concerns that industry has too much influence on regulatory process as compared to the
relatively weak influence of public interest groups).
328. See Model Act, supra note 9, § 7.
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reform legislation is the most appropriate vehicle for achieving the
optimum balance in the application of the punitive damage doctrine.
Despite the BMW decision, the Supreme Court has provided little
actual guidance regarding the imposition of punitive damage awards.
Similarly, state courts and legislatures, although trying to assist in
preventing what they have observed as manifest injustice in the
imposition of these awards, have been equally ineffective in curbing
abuse of the punitive damages system, largely because their power to
regulate stops at their geographic borders. Legislative, not judicial,
action is needed, and to be effective the legislation must be national.
In an effort to reflect the quasi-criminal nature of punitive damage
sanctions, federal tort reform should raise the burden of proof and
create a uniform liability standard predicated on the defendant's
intent. Bifurcation of trials also should be adopted to insure against
jury irrationality and bias. Most importantly, federal reform should
articulate a uniform set of factors for mandatory consideration in
calculating punitive damage awards. Such reforms would effectuate
the necessary safeguards against abuse of the punitive penalties while
simultaneously ensuring that intentional misconduct does not go
unpunished. While safeguards are needed to protect against abuse in
the award of punitive damages, reform should not shield wrongdoers
who have been found, by clear and convincing evidence, to have
intentionally sacrificed public safety for corporate profits. Reforms
that would cap punitive damages by limiting them to a multiple of the
economic and noneconomic loss or to some arbitrary amount should
be avoided because they will undermine the efficacy of the punitive
damage system. Capping punitive damages would shield wrongdoers,
and thereby encourage misconduct, with women and minorities
suffering most.
Federal reform is the only solution to the national crisis in the tort
system. Only through national reform can the uniformity and the
certainty necessary to yield predictable results be achieved. Federal
tort reform will benefit both the consumer and the manufacturer with
consumers knowing their rights and manufacturers knowing their
responsibilities. This will reduce litigation, increase settlement, and
foster respect for, and compliance with, the law.
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